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INTRODUCTION
Presidential election controversies are nothing new. They have
plagued our republic since 180i, when the fourth election for the
office ended in a muddle that nearly deprived the rightful winner
of the presidency. Each controversy has led to calls for reform. In
every instance, the cryptic and troublesome constitutional text has
hampered congressional efforts to correct the problems. Simply
stated, the Constitution offers little explicit guidance on when and
how Congress can regulate the selection of the President. In this
Article, we explore the implications of this textual deficiency,
looking both at what Congress has done in the past and at what it
might do now.
Our analysis proceeds in five steps. Part I of our Article
highlights relevant features of the constitutional text. Part II
explores how Congress reluctantly but successfully used this text
to enact significant reform legislation in response to the Hayes-
Tilden election debacle of 1876. Part III identifies some reforms
that Congress has under consideration to address the problems
that complicated the 2000 presidential vote, focusing on measures
that would lead to nationwide use of a uniform ballot and federally
approved voting devices and machinery. Part IV then examines
whether Congress has the power to enact these measures,
concluding (in an analysis that covers six possible sources of
authority) that it does. Part V urges Congress to wield this power
by enacting significant reform legislation in time for the 2004
election.
Our central message is that our federal leaders should learn from
the past. Following the election of 1876, Congress was able, in time,
to put aside partisan wrangling and constitutional concerns to enact
presidential election reforms that have served our nation well for
more than a century. The present Congress should take bold action
as well. Involdng the powers we identify in this Article, our federal
leaders should respond to the essentially technical and mechanical
problems that cast a lingering cloud over the 2000 election. In short,
Congress should address with visionary legislation the gravest
problems that surfaced in the last election to ensure they do not
reoccur in the future.
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I. THE CONSTITUTIONAL TEXT
The Constitution says surprisingly little about the process of
choosing those individuals empowered to select our President. In
pertinent part, it provides: "Each State shall appoint, in such
Manner as the Legislature thereof may direct, a Number of Electors,
equal to the whole Number of Senators and Representatives to
which the State may be entitled in the Congress .... "1 These
electors, meeting in their respective states, elect the President and
Vice President by majority vote. The Constitution expressly gives
Congress only two roles in this process.2 First, as to the time of
choosing electors and the day on which the electors vote, it states:
"The Congress may determine the Time of chusing the Electors, and
the Day on which they shall give their Votes; which Day shall be
the same throughout the United States."' Second, as to the counting
of votes cast by the electors, it states: "The President of the Senate
shall, in the Presence of the Senate and House of Representatives,
open all the Certificates, and the Votes shall then be counted."4
Only if the electors fail to elect a President or Vice President by
majority vote does Congress take center stage by choosing those
officers from among the top electoral-vote recipients.5
The constitutional process was altered by the Twelfth Amend-
ment after the 1800 election ended in a tie between Republicans
Thomas Jefferson and Aaron Burr, a deadlock resulting from the
failure of the original constitutional text to permit electors to
distinguish between their votes for President and Vice President.'
Republican Party electors, who held a narrow eight-vote majority
1. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1 (emphasis added).
2. In re Green, 134 U.S. 377, 379 (1890).
3. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1. This provision stands in contrast to the Article I clause that
confers on Congress power with respect to the election of its own members. Regarding
congressional elections, the Constitution states: "The Times, Places and Manner of holding
Elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the
Legislature thereof; but the Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such
Regulations, except as to the Places of chusing Senators." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4. For a
discussion of this power, see generally infra notes 250-62 and accompanying text.
4. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1.
5. Id.; U.S. CoNsT. amend. XI.
6. MARYB=THNORTONETAL., APEOPLE&ANATON:AHISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES
226, app. at A-30 (4th ed. 1994).
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of the electoral college, all duly voted for Jefferson and Burr,
intending the former to become President and the latter to
become Vice President. The resulting tie threw the election into
the House of Representatives, where lame-duck Federalists saw
an opportunity to frustrate their opponents by electing Burr (or
even their own candidate, the third place finisher John Adams)
over Jefferson. In the end, the Federalists relented,' and the new
Republican-dominated Congress promptly passed a constitutional
amendment specifying that electors must separately designate
their votes for President and for Vice President.' The Twelfth
Amendment also clarified that, if no candidate for President
receives a majority of the electoral vote, then the House of
Representatives chooses the President by majority vote (with the
delegation from each state casting a single vote) from among the
three top candidates.l" Similarly, if no candidate for Vice President
receives a majority of the electoral vote, then the Senate elects
the Vice President by majority vote from among the two top
candidates." The states quickly ratified this amendment, but never
again effected any constitutional changes regarding the electoral-
vote process. Thus the cryptic provisions of Article II and the
Twelfth Amendment remain unadorned in the constitutional text
to this day.'2
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. U.S. CONST. amend. XII.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. See 15 CONG. REC. 5456 (1884), where Rep. Abraham X. Parker of New York
observed: "No difference existed between the old Constitution and the amendment except as
relating to separate action in the selection of Vice-President. The language as to the electoral
count is the same in both." See also 17 CONG. REC. 815 (1886), where Senate President Pro
Tempore John Sherman of Ohio added:
The constitutional provision as to the election of President was unsatisfactory
to the framers of the Constitution, and it was changed after the celebrated
difficulty when it was a long time in doubt whether Aaron Burr or Thomas
Jefferson should be President of the United States. This demonstrated that the
original provision of the Constitution was faulty, and our predecessors of that
day undertook to correct it and adopt a new provision, but that new provision
presents many of the same difficulties that occurred under the old, and to this
day Congress has never been able to solve any of them.
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Under these provisions, state legislatures are empowered to
devise their own "Manner" for appointing presidential electors. 3 In
one of its few decisions interpreting this language, the Supreme
Court stated:
The Constitution does not provide that the appointment of
electors shall be by popular vote, nor that the electors shall be
voted for upon a general ticket, nor that the majority of those
who exercise the elective franchise can alone choose the electors.
It recognizes that the people act through their representatives
in the legislature, and leaves it to the legislature exclusively to
define the method of effecting the object.'4
Delegates to the Constitutional Convention did consider various
methods for selecting electors, but ultimately rejected them all in
favor of leaving the choice to the individual state legislatures. The
records of the Convention disclose that separate proposals that the
President be elected either by "the citizens of the United States"
through a nationwide vote or "by electors to be chosen by the people
of the several states" were defeated even though James Madison
favored the former approach and Alexander Hamilton favored the
latter one.' For a time, the Convention leaned toward having the
President chosen by Congress, an approach favored by Roger
Sherman, 6 but in the end left it to the state legislatures, who would
presumably either appoint electors directly, provide for their
popular election by district, or opt for their election by statewide
vote. 17
All three of these different methods of choosing electors were
employed by various states at various times. In the first pres-
idential election, for example, electors were chosen directly by
the legislatures in about half of the states and elected by district
or statewide vote in the rest. 8 This rough split in approaches
13. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 2; U.S. CONST. amend. XII.
14. McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U.S. 1, 27 (1892).
15. 1 DEBATES ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 208, 262 (Jonathan
Elliot ed., 1836) [hereinaftr ELLIOT's DEBATES]; JAMES MADISON, JOURNALOFTHE FEDERAL
CONVENTION 284-90 (E.H. Scott ed., 1840).
16. 1 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 15, at 156; MADISON, supra note 15, at 88, 90.
17. McPherson, 146 U.S. at 28.
18. Id. at 29.
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continued through the presidential election of 1796, but thereafter
most states moved toward choosing electors through some sort of
popular vote.19 Initially, states' electors were chosen on a district-
by-district basis, with one elector chosen from each congressional
or electoral district (typically with two electors chosen at large
where congressional districts were used).20 The district method
fell out of favor early in the 1800s, as states sought to gain
influence in federal politics by block voting.21 By 1836, every
state had adopted the statewide election method of choosing
electors except for South Carolina, which followed the legislative-
appointment approach until 1868.22 Despite the occasional argu-
ment that the district method offered a more democratic approach
to electing electors,23 that method is now used only in Maine and
Nebraska.24 Occasionally, temporary expediencies have caused
individual states that otherwise would have chosen their electors by
popular vote to appoint them legislatively, such as Florida in 1868
and Colorado in 1876Y. Yet the votes of these electors were counted
by Congress (just as they were when unusual procedures were used
by Hawaii in 1960)26 in keeping with the idea that the method of
choosing electors is expressly reserved to state legislatures. 7
The principle of broad state control over selecting electors was
affirmed by one of the great constitutional craftsmen of the early
nineteenth century, Justice Joseph Story. In his historic and
influential Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States,
Justice Story explained:
In some states the legislature have [sic] directly chosen the
electors by themselves; in others they have been chosen by the
people by a general ticket throughout the whole state; and in
others by the people in electoral districts, fixed by the
legislature, a certain number of electors being apportioned to
19. Id. at 30-31; NORTON ETAL., supra note 6, at 223.
20. McPherson, 146 U.S. at 31-32.
21. See id. at 32.
22. J. HAMPDONDOUGHERTY, THEELECTORALSYSTEMOFTHE UNITED STATES 303 (1906).
23. See id. at 294-324.
24. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 21-A, § 802 (West 1993); NEB. REV. STAT. § 32-714 (1998).
25. McPherson, 146 U.S. at 33 (noting legislative appointments in Florida and Colorado).
26. See Peter Braestrup, Nixon Presides over Tally Naming Kennedy, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
7, 1961, at Al.
27. McPherson, 146 U.S. at 36.
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each district. No question has ever arisen, as to the
constitutionality of either mode, except that of a direct choice by
the legislature. But this, though often doubted by able and
ingenious minds, has been firmly established in practice, ever
since the adoption of the constitution, and does not now seem to
admit of controversy, even if a suitable tribunal existed to
adjudicate upon it.'
After recounting this history, Story added a personal, concluding
observation about presidential elections: "It has been thought
desirable by many statesmen to have the constitution amended so,
as to provide for a uniform mode of choice by the people."29
Congress repeatedly considered such amendments in the years
before and after Story wrote, but never passed any of them.0 In one
1874 report recommending such an amendment, the Senate
Elections Committee emphasized:
The appointment of these electors is thus placed absolutely
and wholly with the legislatures of the several States. They may
be chosen by the legislature, or the legislature may provide that
they shall be elected by the people of the State at large, or in
districts, as are members of Congress, which was the case
formerly in many States; and it is no doubt competent for the
legislature to authorize the governor, or the supreme court of
the State, or any other agent of its will, to appoint these electors.
This power is conferred upon the legislatures of the States by
the Constitution of the United States, and cannot be taken from
them [without a Constitutional amendment] ....
More than 125 years have passed since the issuance of this Senate
report, and nearly 175 years have passed since Justice Story wrote
28. 3 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ONTHE CONSTITUTION OFTHE UNITED STATES, WITH
A PRELIMINARY REvIEW OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE COLONIES AND STATES
BEFORE THE ADOPTION OF THE CONSTITUTION 328-29 (1833) (citations omitted).
29. Id. at 329.
30. E.g., McPherson, 146 U.S. at 33-35; Albert J. Rosenthal, The Constitution, Congress,
and Presidential Elections, 67 MICH. L. REV. 1, 1 n.2 (1968) (noting that through 1966,
Congress had considered 513 proposed constitutional amendments regarding presidential
elections).
31. S. REP. NO. 43-395, at 9 (1874).
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on the matter. Yet these commentaries remain valid restatements
of the constitutional law on presidential elections.
In its most direct pronouncement on the subject prior to Bush v.
Gore,32 the Supreme Court wrote in 1890 about the boundaries
between state and federal authority over the electoral-vote process:
Although the electors are appointed and act under and
pursuant to the Constitution of the United States, they are no
more officers or" agents of the United States than are the
members of the state legislatures when acting as electors of
federal senators, or the people of the States when acting as
electors of representatives in Congress.
In accord with the provisions of the Constitution, Congress
has determined the time as of which the number of electors shall
be ascertained, and the days on which they shall be appointed
and shall meet and vote in the States, and on which their votes
shall be counted in Congress; has provided for the filling by each
state, in such manner as its legislature may prescribe, of
vacancies in its college of electors; and has regulated the
manner of certifying and transmitting their votes to the seat of
the national government, and the course of proceeding in their
opening and counting them.
Congress has never undertaken to interfere with the manner
of appointing electors, or, where (according to the now general
usage) the mode of appointment prescribed by the law of the
State is election by the people, to regulate the conduct of such
election, or to punish any fraud in voting for electors; but has
left these matters to the control of the States."3
This pronouncement is significant in part because it followed closely
on the heels of heated congressional debate over the subject and
cited with apparent approval the statutory fruit of that debate, the
Electoral Count Act of 1887."4 This Act-which treated the subjects
of vote certification, transmission and counting-has remained in
effect ever since and represents the full extent to which Congress
has assumed authority over the electoral vote process. The
32. 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
33. In re Green, 134 U.S. 377, 379-80 (1890) (citations omitted).
34. Electoral Count Act, ch. 90, 24 Stat. 373 (1887).
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legislative history of that Act thus provides critical legal and
practical precedent for any future congressional action in this area.
II. ELECTORAL REFORM AND THE 1876 ELECTION
In the bitter aftermath of the Civil War, presidential elections of
the late 1800s were far less civil than they have been in more recent
times. The partisan divide separating Democrats and Republicans,
nurtured by wartime hatreds and postwar demagogy, tested the
electoral process as never before, and as never since. Adding to the
uncivil federal politics of the era, the American electorate was so
evenly split along partisan lines that neither party could gain a
clear advantage. From the congressional elections of 1874 (the first
postwar election in which the South fully participated) through the
congressional elections of 1894 (by which point wartime divisions
had somewhat healed) there was divided control of Congress. 5
Democrats controlled the House of Representatives for all but two
years (1889-1891) of this twenty-year period while Republicans
controlled the Senate during the entire period except for two years
(1879-1881), during which each party held an equal number of
Senate seats.36 To further complicate matters, throughout this
period no candidate for President received a majority of the
nationwide popular vote except for Samuel J. Tilden in 1876, and
he lost the presidency in a disputed electoral-vote count conducted
by a divided Congress. 7
Prior to this twenty-year span of bitter partisan division, the
United States had generally experienced long stretches of one-party
ascendency. Indeed, from the founding of the Republic through
1875, control over Congress and the Presidency, and between the
two houses of Congress, had rarely been divided between the
political parties.38 The only exceptions to this pattern of unified
control arose during brief transition intervals, such as when
Jefferson's Republicans replaced Adams's Federalists after the
election of 1800, when the old Democratic-Republican Party
35. NORTON ET AL., supra note 6, app. at A-45, A-46 (noting party strength in Congress
from 1874 through 1894).
36. Id.
37. For election results and analysis, see id. at 489-95, app. at A-32.
38. Id. app. at A-30 to A-46.
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splintered in the election of 1824 into factions led by John Quincy
Adams, Andrew Jackson, Henry Clay, and William Crawford, and
when the modern Republican Party coalesced during the 1850s. 9
Onlyinthese periods of change did challenges arise to the electoral-
vote process, but they quickly died down with the return of one-
party rule.
With the rise of persistent divided government following 1874,
however, the electoral-vote process became problematic. All agreed
that state legislatures controlled the basic methods of choosing
electors, but heated debate arose over the extent of congressional
power in supervising the process.40 In tight elections with razor-thin
margins conducted in an era of Northern military occupation of the
South and widespread political corruption,41 the power to supervise
could determine the result. But what power did Congress have in
the process? The Constitution (as we have seen) states only that
"[t]he President of the Senate shall, in the presence of the Senate
and House of Representatives, open all the certificates and the
votes shall then be counted."42 Does this language empower the
Congress (as opposed to the President of the Senate) to count
electoral votes? If so, should it act as a single canvassing board or
concurrently as two legislative houses? In either event, can
Congress go behind the certificates in determining the legitimacy
of particular electoral votes? Can it choose between conflicting
electoral certificates submitted from a single state, and if so, when
and how? Can it impose any standards on the states to prevent
fraud or miscounting? All these issues and more were raised on the
floor of Congress during the post-Civil War debates over the
presidential election process.'
From 1861 to 1875, Republicans controlled both houses of
Congress." They used their resulting power to adopt and to enforce
a joint congressional rule to the effect that, in the case of any
39. For election results and analysis, see id. at 226,380, app. at A-30 to A-31, A-45 to A-
46.
40. E.g., 18 CONG. REC. 46,74 (1886); 17 CONG. REC. 818, 1058-60 (1886); 15 CONG. REC.
5079, 5460, 5466-67,5547 (1884).
41. See supra notes 35-37 and accompanying text; infra notes 43-117 and accompanying
text.
42. U.S. CONST. amend. XII.
43. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
44. NORTON ET AL., supra note 6, app. at A-46.
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controversy over the legitimacy of electoral votes from any state,
contested votes were excluded unless the House of Representatives
and Senate concurred in counting them.45 The rule worked well for
Republicans because, in the immediate aftermath of the Civil War,
Democrats could not hope to win the presidency without electoral
votes from Southern states.46 In the states of that region, however,
the explosive mix of unreconstructed rlative whites on the
Democratic side versus carpetbaggers and freed former slaves
backed by federal troops on the Republican side made election
disputes endemic."' Thus, the joint congressional rule tended to
favor Republicans whose "safe" Northern states generated fewer
election controversies.4" This rule, in effect for the 1864, 1868, and
1872 presidential elections, was used by the Republican majorities
in Congress during each of those elections to exclude electoral votes
cast for Democratic candidates. 9 Importantly, however, the
excluded votes never determined the ultimate outcome of any of
these elections.5"
Events played out differently in 1876, when contested votes did
decide the final result and sparked a national crisis.5 A narrow
45. See 15 CONG. REC. 5458 (1884) (statement of Rep. Parker setting forth this joint rule
and describing its impact).
46. See W. DEAN BURNHAM, PRESIDENTIAL BALLOTS 1836-1892, at 158-59 (1955).
47. MICHAEL LES BENEDICT, THE BLESSINGS OFLiBERTY 214 (1996). Discussing elections
in the former Confederacy during this period, constitutional historian Benedict writes:
In several states, fraud and violence led both Republicans and Democrats to
claim victory in elections. Each party then appealed to President Grant to
recognize and support its claim under the constitutional clause empowering the
national government to guarantee republican government in the states. Several
Republican state governments remained in power only through such decisions
and the willingness of Grant to use troops to enforce them.
Id.
48. See id. (describing predominantly southern election disputes).
49. See 17 CONG. REC. 815 (1886); 15 CONG. REC. 5458, 5466 (1884).
50. See id. (featuring congressional analysis and comment to this effect).
51. Comparing the intervention of Congress in prior post-Civil War electoral counts with
its intervention in the 1877 count, Ohio Senator John Sherman, who had witnessed it all as
a leading Republican member of Congress since 1855, an architect of Hayes's electoral
triumph, and a member of Hayes's cabinet, observed:
Several times that condition of affairs existed, until finally, in 1877, we came
to a point that did really threaten our national existence; when civil war might
have occurred under certain circumstances; where the disputed votes did
change the result; where a change even to the extent of one vote might have
altered the result.
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partisan divide split the country in 1876. Republicans still
controlled in the Senate, but Democrats had taken the House of
Representatives and would not be party to the joint congressional
rule that had bolstered Republican electoral margins in the
previous three contests. 2 When the popular votes were counted for
President in 1876, the Democrat, Samuel J. Tilden of New York,
won a clear majority over the Republican, Rutherford B. Hayes of
Ohio-by a margin of fifty-one percent to forty-eight percent-and
appeared to have won the electoral contest as well, thanks in part
to a clean sweep of the South. 3
National Republican leaders, however, were convinced that white
Democrats kept black Republicans from voting across the South
and would not accept Tilden's apparent victory.54 They could not
do much about the outcome in reconstructed Southern states,
but Republican governments still clung to power with the support
of federal troops in three former Confederate states: Florida,
Louisiana and South Carolina. 5 With small popular-vote adjust-
ments in each of these three states, Hayes could claim their
electoral votes and, with them, the election-by a single electoral
vote."5 Republican Party leaders set about to make that result a
reality. In the contested states, Republican-controlled election
boards held the power to disqualify votes tainted by fraud or
intimidation.57 Using this power, they threw out enough democratic
votes to allow Republican electors to win in all three states."8 When
these Republican electors met in their respective state capitals,
however, Democratic electors convened as well.59 Both sets of
electors duly voted and submitted their conflicting votes to
Washington. 0
After weeks of partisan deadlock and rising threats of violence,
Congress created a federal election commission to resolve the
17 CONG. REC. 815 (1886).
52. See STEPHEN G. CHRISTIANSON, FACTS ABOUT THE CONGRESS 190 (1996).
53. See ARI HOOGENBOOM, RUTHERFORD B. HAYES: WARRIORAND PRESIDENT 274 (1995).
54. Id. at 276.
55. Id. at 275.
56. Id. at 276-77.
57. Id. at 275.
58. Id. at 277-79.
59. Id. at 275.
60. Id. at 279; BENEDICT, supra note 47, at 214.
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controversy.6" The decisions of this commission regarding the
contested electoral votes could be rejected only by the joint
action of both the Republican Senate and Democratic House of
Representatives,62 so its ruling in favor of either candidate would
stand as a practical matter. The creation of this commission was an
act more of expediency than of statesmanship, for leaders of each
party thought that the commission would favor its side.6" The
Senate appointed five Republican senators to the commission; the
House appointed five of its Democratic members to it; and five
members came from the Supreme Court.64 Two of the Supreme
Court members were to be chosen from the Court's Republican
majority; two were to be the Court's two Democratic justices; and
the fifth was to be the Court's lone Independent, David Davis.65
Democrats thought that the highly principled Davis would support
Tilden as the rightful winner.66 On the other hand, Davis had been
named to the Supreme Court by a Republican President and
confirmed by a Republican-controlled Senate, giving Republicans
reason to expect his support. In the end, however, Davis did not
vote with the commission at all. At the time, Davis was a third-
party candidate for the U.S. Senate in his home state of Illinois."
Hoping to win his favor on the commission, Illinois Democrats
threw their support behind him.6 When Davis won, however, he
felt honor-bound not to serve as a Supreme Court representative on
the commission.69 The Court had to name a replacement, with only
Republicans left to fill the vacancy."0
61. HOOGENBOOM, supra note 53, at 285; CHRISTIANSON, supra note 52, at 190.
62. HOOGENBOOM, supra note 53, at 285.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 286.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. See BENEDICT, supra note 47, at 215; HOOGENBOOM, supra note 53, at 285. For later
congressional analysis to this effect by some of the individuals involved, see 17 CONG. REC.
1024(1886) (statement ofRep. Ingalls) ("The Electoral Commission of 1877 was acontrivance
that will never be repeated in our politics. It was a device that was favored by each party in
the belief that it would cheat the other, and it resulted, as I once before said, in defrauding
both."); 15 CONG. REC. 5079 (1884) (statement of Rep. Browne) (similar). In the immediate
aftermath ofthe CivilWar,with ongoingdisputes aboutvoting rights similarforfreed slaves,
the electoral process throughout the South was deeply flawed. Many Republican leaders
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After months of squabbling and with just hours left before the
inauguration, congressional Republicans backed by Republican
members of the electoral commission (which voted eight to seven
along party lines in every instance) accepted the Republican
electors from all three disputed states.71 Enraged Democratic
congressmen boycotted the session.72 Hayes was called by the title
"His Fraudulency" (or worse) and did not stand for reelection in
1880.7" At the time, even the respected Republican Henry Adams,
a descendent of two presidents involved in disputed electoral
contests, dismissed Hayes as "a third-rate nonentity."74
In the aftermath of the Hayes-Tilden deadlock, and with the
prospect of similarly close elections to come, a deeply divided and
highly suspicious Congress tried to lay out rules that would guide
and constrain its future role in counting electoral votes. Legislators
from both parties sincerely doubted if the Republic could survive a
repeat of the 1876-1877 debacle. "It is as certain as that God's sun
shines that men will not submit to wrongs of that character
again-never again," declared Democrat William W. Eaton, who
served as a senator at the time of the Hayes-Tilden election and
later as a House member.75 "There must be some mode of counting
the electoral votes that we can agree upon .... "76
For ten years, from 1877 to 1887, Congress struggled to come
together on a law that would set rules in advance to prevent the
types of electoral-vote difficulties that marred the 1876 election.77
Most critically for the purposes of this Article, the main cause for
delay and disagreement over the enactment of reform legislation
did not involve policy or partisan differences. It came instead from
sincerely believed that if blacks had been allowed to participate fully and fairly in the 1876
presidential election, then Hayes would have won all three of the key states. Even without
the participation of freed slaves, he probably did receive more popular votes than Tilden in
South Carolina and Florida. At the time, neither side conceded anything and it came down
to which electors Congress would count. HOOGENBOOM, supra note 53, at 277-79.
71. HOOGENBOOM, supra note 53, at 294.
72. Id.
73. Jonathan Riskind, Hayes Overcame Taint of 1876, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Jan. 14,
2001, at D1.
74. Id.
75. 15 CONG. REC. 5079 (1884); see also 17 CONG. REc. 2427 (1886) (statement of Sen.
Hoar); 17 CONG. REC. 1025 (1886) (statement of Sen. Ingalls).
76. 15 CONG. REC. 5079 (1884) (statement of Rep. Eaton).
77. See 15 CONG. REC. 5547 (1884) (statement of Rep. Herbert).
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the concern of many Democratic lawmakers (most of whom clung to
Jacksonian notions of states' rights forged in the years leading up
to and including the Civil War) over the extent of Congress's
constitutional power to interfere by federal statute in the state
electoral-vote process.7" Only the imminent prospect of a repeat of
the 1876 deadlock in the 1888 election finally forced a sufficient
number of these states-rights Democrats to swallow their doubts
and join with their colleagues of both political parties to pass the
1887 statute that has governed the electoral-vote process to this
day.79 These century-old congressional debates over federal power
are instructive as Congress again considers statutory reform in this
field.
Essentially the same legislation was debated in each congres-
sional session following the 1876 election. Usually it passed the
Republican-dominated Senate on a bipartisan basis.° Then it would
die in the Democratic-led House.8 ' The stalemate finally broke in
1887, when legislation was narrowly crafted to address the specific
problem of post-election rule changes that had triggered the Hayes-
Tilden debacle.82 Under it, states could ensure that Congress would
count their electoral votes as cast if they designated their electors
pursuant to state laws enacted prior to election day and certified
those electors at least six days before the day fixed by Congress for
electors to vote.' In the case of electors not so designated or
certified and in the case of multiple certified slates of electors from
a state, the House of Representatives and the Senate would
78. E.g., 17 CONG. REC. 1019 (1886) (statement of Sen. Hoar) ("I think I may say as a
mater [sic] now settled by a pretty long experience that the arguments which are made
against the bill almost all proceed from supposing that it is an attempt to amend a defect
which is due to the Constitution itself and criticising [sic] it in that respect .... ."); 17 CONG.
REc. 863-64 (1886) (statement of Sen. Morgan) ("So in the debate on this question we may
all assume that there is no political controversy involved, and that we are trying to find the
boundary and measure of our powers under the Constitution .... "). For a discussion of the
notion of states' rights held by many Northern and Southern Democrats during this period,
see BENEDICT, supra note 47, at 186-87, 200-15.
79. See 15 CONG. REC. 5459, 5546, 5548 (1884).
80. E.g., 15 CONG. REC. 430 (1884).
81. E.g., 17 CONG. REc. 863-64 (1886) (statement of Sen. Morgan regarding a bill
frequently adopted by the Senate, but rejected by the House).
82. 3 U.S.C. §§ 5, 15 (2000).
83. Id.
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concurrently rule on which electors to accept.8 ' If the two bodies
could not agree, then the slate of electors certified by the state's
governor would be counted, with none counted if the governor had
either not certified any electors or had certified more than one
slate.' Although this statute thus leaves matters largely to the
states, it limits state discretion as to important matters of timing
(including by vigorously discouraging ex post facto interference with
the electoral process). 6 In addition, and even more importantly, the
law asserts final congressional authority in counting electoral
votes.8 ' As a result, Congress claimed a decisive role in the
electoral-vote process and created a precedent for an even larger
role should the need arise. Most critically, it would be a
congressional statute, not only the Constitution, that set the precise
parameters for state and federal control of the electoral-vote
process.
The constitutional basis that lay behind congressional action in
1887 is instructive for Congress today. First and foremost,
supporters of reform claimed the authority to act in this area based
on an express power to count the electoral votes. Referring to the
constitutional provision that electoral certificates be opened before
a joint session of Congress, where "the votes shall then be
counted," 8 Democratic Representative Luke Prior from Alabama,
a House committee chairman and proponent of electoral-vote
reform, observed: "I repeat and now insist that in this word vote is
included the ascertainment and determination of all defects,
irregularities, illegalities, non-qualifications of electors or persons
voted for, frauds, corruptions, or coercions, from the suffragan
through its transit to this Federal board .... Prior went on to
declare, "we have the right and it is our duty, if need be, to go
into and behind the returns of electors ... to find the true will of
the sovereign of sovereigns-the people."" Similarly, Democratic
Representative Andrew Jackson Caldwell of Tennessee asserted:
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id
87. Icl
88. U.S. Const. amend. XII.
89. 15 CONG. REc. 5101 (1884).
90. Id. at 5105.
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"The power of the two Houses in counting the vote is something
more than ministerial and perfunctory merely. Congress may
provide by law or joint rule the manner of counting the vote."9
Other congressional proponents of the legislation made similar
statements.92
Proponents supplemented their reliance on Congress's authority
to count with invocations of the general Article I power of Congress
"[to make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper" to
carry out its enumerated powers." For example, Democratic
Representative William M. Springer of Illinois, a long-serving
House Committee Chairman and future federal appellate court
judge, expounded: "If Congress may make all laws which are
necessary to carry into effect the powers granted by the Consti-
tution, it may make such laws as it may deem necessary to carry
out that express provision of the Constitution, to count the votes for
President and Vice-President."94 Likewise, Democratic House
Committee Chairman and future cabinet member Hilary Herbert,
normally a strict constructionist, stated in this context:
[Tihe Constitution vests in the Federal Government the power
to count the votes; and the exercise of that power is a Federal
function, to be controlled by the Federal Government .... A
power has been given, and it is perfectly plain that the
Constitution vests in Congress the power to enact what
legislation is necessary and proper to carry out the purposes of
the provision granting the power.95
Other supporters made similar assertions of congressional
authority.9
6
91. 18 CONG. REC. 30 (1886).
92. E.g., id. at 49 (1886) (statement of Rep. Cooper); 15 CONG. REC. 5464 (1884)
(statement of Rep. Peters).
93. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
94. 15 CONG. REC. 5461 (1884).
95. 18 CONG. REc. 75 (1886). Regarding the role of federal government, Herbert once
said, "I believe in as little government as possible-that Government should keep hands off
and allow the individual fair play." DANIEL J. KEvLES, THE PHYSICISTS: THE HISTORY OF A
SCIENTIFIC COMMUNITYINMODERNAMERICA 55 (1978) (discussing Herberes views on states'
rights and limited federal government).
96. E.g., 18 CONG. REC. 49 (1886) (statement of Rep. Cooper); id. at 50 (1886) (statement
of Rep. Eden).
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Congressional opponents of the legislation, while generally
agreeing that reform was advisable," denied the power of Congress
to act in this area, at least by way of statute. Representative
Thomas M. Browne of Indiana declared:
The framers of the Constitution withheld from Congress the
power to interfere with this count; they withheld it by not
committing the power to it. When the Constitution confers a
power it does so in express words, as Congress shall have power
to borrow money, collect taxes, regulate commerce, coin money,
and the like. By no words, by no implication, has the power been
given Congress to settle questions concerning the electoral
count.9
Senator John Tyler Morgan of Alabama, a former secessionist
leader and Confederate general, claimed that "this notion of a new
constitutional power" over the electoral count was "drawn solely
from the generous warmth and fertility of the imagination of the
senator from Ohio,"99 John Sherman, younger brother of the famed
Union general William Tecumseh Sherman. The younger Sherman
was a master politician who at the time reigned over the
Republican Senate as ]resident Pro Tempore and as a committee
chairman, once served as Hayes's Treasury Secretary, and would
later serve as President McKinley's Secretary of State.0 0 He was
also a prime architect of the reform legislation, just as he had been
of the electoral commission that deprived Tilden of the 1876
election.' 1" Southern Democrats were deeply suspicious of him.02
Agreeing with Morgan's view of the matter, Democratic
Representative Samuel Dibble of South Carolina argued that
"Congress has no power in relation to the electoral vote except to
97. E.g., 17 CONG. REC. 1058 (1886) (statement of Sen. Wilson).
.98. 15 CONG. REC. 5465 (1884).
99. 17 CONG. REC. 865 (1886).
100. For background on John Sherman, including Sherman's role in authoring many of
the era's most important laws, including the Sherman Antitrust Act, see Charles W.
Calhoun, John Sherman, in 4 DONALD C. BACON ET AL., THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE UNITED
STATES CONGRESS 1813-16 (1995).
101. Id. (describing Sherman's role in reform legislation); HOOGENBOOM, supra note 53,
at 277-94 (describing Sherman's role in the election of 1876).
102. See 17 CONG. REC. 865 (1886) (slurring reference of Sherman's role in this matter by
a Southern senator).
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count, in the sense of enumeration."' Other opponents leveled
similar charges.' 04
Concerns over the statute's constitutionality were not limited to
its opponents. Even its chief sponsor in the House of Represent-
atives, William Eaton of Connecticut, expressed grave doubts about
Congress's authority over the electoral-vote process.' Only his fear
for the survival of the Republic in the face of electoral chaos led him
to support the reform legislation.'06 Biting the bullet, he prodded his
reluctant colleagues to act by invoking a then-familiar aphorism:
"[Glreat men made precedents and little ones followed them. Now,
let us make a precedent." 7 On this point, his Democratic colleague
Hilary Herbert agreed:
I believe this Congress at this session ought to pass some law on
this question. The situation is just as it was eight years ago [in
1876]. We are entering on what is likely to be a very exciting
Presidential campaign. The House is Democratic and the Senate
is Republican, and if we adjourn this session without having
agreed upon any rule or any law which shall regulate the count
of the electoral vote we may have a deadlock again next winter.
I do not believe the country would submit to another
electoralcommission [sic]. Upon the passage of some law now to
regulate the count may depend the peace of the country and the
perpetuity of our institutions. I believe that a bad law would be
better than no law at all.108
This sentiment ultimately carried the day, and Congress passed the
Electoral Count Act of 1887' °9 despite lingering concerns regarding
its constitutionality.
As Representative Eaton predicted, the new statute has served
a vital purpose. With minor modifications, it has remained the law
of the land to this day. Its gravest test came in the very next
election, conducted in 1888. In that highly partisan and bitterly
103. 18 CONG. REC. 45 (1886).
104. E.g., 17 CONG. REC. 1058 (1886) (statement of Sen. Evarts).
105. E.g., 15 CONG. REC. 5076-78 (1884).
106. Id. at 5079, 5459, 5546.
107. Id. at 5548.
108. Id. at 5546 (statement of Rep. Herbert).
109. Electoral Count Act, ch. 90, 24 Stat. 373 (1887).
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divided race, the Democratic candidate and incumbent President
Grover Cleveland won a plurality of the popular vote (48.6% to
47.9%) but lost the electoral vote to Republican Benjamin Harrison
on the basis of highly suspect vote totals from two key states
that Cleveland had won four years earlier." ° According to those
final tallies, Cleveland lost his own home state of New York by a
mere 14,000 votes (or fewer than one percent of the votes cast)
and Harrison's home state of Indiana by even less."' Some of
Cleveland's advisors urged him to challenge those results," 2 and
Republican efforts for Hayes in 1876 gave him ample precedent for
doing so."' The Republican electors from New York and Indiana,
however, had been duly certified in accord with the provisions of the
1887 Act, which Cleveland himself had signed into law."' So he did
not challenge the submission of New York or Indiana, and when
asked why he lost the election, he coyly replied, "[Ilt was mainly
because the other party had the most votes.""5 Four years later, the
American people rewarded Cleveland with a convincing popular and
electoral vote victory in a rematch with Benjamin Harrison." 6
Cleveland's biography is titled A Study in Character."7 His action
set a standard for our nation's lawful transfer of presidential power.
That standard was founded on Congress's willingness to take the
responsibility to forge statutory rules for presidential elections.
Congress asserted its power to act in 1887, and that assertion of
power has never been successfully challenged.
Ill. CURRENT REFORM PROPOSALS
Like the Hayes-Tilden contest, the disputed election of 2000 has
demonstrated a need to reform how the United States chooses its
President. Many of the reform proposals are not new and, whatever
110. See ALYN BRODSKY, GROVER CLEVELAND: A STUDY IN CHARACTER 238 (2000).
111. NORTON ETAL., supra note 6, at 608.
112. ALLANNEVINS, GROVERCLEVELAND: ASTUDYIN COURAGE 437-38 (1944) (discussing
charges of election fraud in New York and Indiana raised by Cleveland's partisans).
113. Supra notes 51-71 and accompanying text.
114. NEVINS, supra note 112, at 345.
115. BRODSKY, supra note 110, at 239. Note that Cleveland said that the other party, not
the other candidate, had the most votes. Id.
116. See id. at 282.
117. Id.
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their merits, do not distinctively address the problems raised by the
2000 election. Reformers have debated the merits of directly
electing the President by popular vote since the founding of the
Republic, for example, and the occasional occurrence of a candidate
winning the highest office in the land without a plurality of the
popular vote inevitably resurrects the issue."' The 2000 election
proved no exception, though it is unlikely to produce any such
fundamental reform." 9
Less sweeping proposals for altering the electoral college system
have also been resurrected, such as replacing the winner-take-all
approach currently used by forty-eight states with a proportional
system tied to either the statewide popular vote or the popular vote
of individual electoral districts. 20 In recent years, reformers have
persistently tried to tighten campaign finance laws, and the vast
amount of money flooding through loopholes in the current
statutory regime during the 2000 election has increased their
zeal. 121
More peculiar to the 2000 election, however, was the spectacle of
simply trying to count the votes accurately in Florida. Given the
near-even split in other states, the electoral votes of Florida would
decide the presidency, yet for weeks it remained uncertain whether
George W. Bush or Al Gore had received the most votes there. The
final official tally gave Bush the edge by fewer than 1000 votes,
with over ten times that many disputed ballots in Miami-Dade
County alone. Subsequent unofficial recounts seem to have
confirmed Bush's win on the basis of valid ballots but have not
erased concern over the large number of invalid ones.'22 For
example, as to the 10,644 Miami-Dade County ballots that election
118. See supra notes 35-117 and accompanying text.
119. See Richard E. Cohen& Louis Jacobson, Can It Be Done?, 32 NAT'L J., Nov. 18,2000,
at 3658-60 (discussing postelection calls for abolishing the electoral college but suggesting
that a sufficient number of small states will oppose such a reform to block any constitutional
amendment to that effect); Stanley Fish, The High-Minded Fight Over Florida, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 15, 2000, at A29.
120. E.g., Yuval Rosenberg, Building a Better Election, NEWSWEEK, Nov. 20,2000, at 20.
121. See David Moberg, Keep FloridaAlive: The Election Fiasco Should Lead to Wholesale
Reform, INTHESE TnMES, Jan. 8,2001, at 12, available athttp://www.inthesetimes.comissue/
25/03/moberg2503b.html.
122. See Upon Further Review ... Bush Still Wins, ATLANTAJ.-CONST., Feb. 26, 2001, at
Al (reviewing the election contest in Florida and reporting that a postelection recount by the
Miami Herald confirmed Bush the winner by a 140-vote margin).
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officials excluded from the count because they bore no machine-
readable vote for President, an unofficial recount found that 3061
ballots bore some kind of marking that could be interpreted as a
vote for either Bush or Gore (netting Gore a total of 49 votes); 4892
ballots bore no markings for President; 527 ballots bore markings
for more than one presidential candidate; and 1912 (or more than
enough to decide the outcome) bore clean punches in vacant ballot
positions, with 1667 of these just below the numbers corresponding
to one of the two major candidates.2 3 Even graver concerns were
raised about the accuracy of the vote in Florida's Palm Beach
County, where the layout of the punch-card ballot apparently led
thousands of voters to punch the hole for Reform Party candidate
Pat Buchanan rather than the one for Al Gore.' 4 These voting and
counting problems may well have decided the election.
Events in Florida have fueled calls for reform in voting
procedures to reduce the number of such errors. Shortly after the
election, for example, one commentator wrote:
Democracy is-or should be-more than voting, but if votes
aren't even accurately counted, democracy is a fraud and there's
less reason for anyone to head to the polls. This year's balloting
could have been a civics lesson in how every vote can count;
instead it has shown how many votes don't. The Florida fiasco
(which could have been repeated in many other states)
demonstrated that America doesn't take democracy seriously
enough to make even the modest investments needed for
technological reliability."
Although this commentator advocated such long-advocated
"wholesale" reforms as direct election of the President, proportional
electoral voting and broadened campaign-finance restrictions, he
also stressed that "better technical methods of counting votes, more
politically neutral election officials and national minimum
standards for federal elections would be a small step in the right
123. Id.
124. Ballot Design Cost Gore 6,607 Votes, Paper Says, WASH. POST, Mar. 11, 2001, at A10.
125. Moberg, supra note 121, at 13.
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direction." 126 Numerous other commentators have called for similar
procedural reforms in the wake of the Florida vote.127
These proposals have centered on two key procedural reforms.
One involves minimum national standards for voting devices
or machines.' 2 Another proposes a uniform national ballot. 129
Like the electoral-vote reforms enacted by federal statute after
the Hayes-Tilden election, these reforms narrowly address
identifiable problems highlighted in a particular presidential
election. Constitutional scholars have questioned whether Congress
has the power to impose these narrow procedural reforms, 8 ' but
this fact has not stopped individual members of Congress from
proposing them.
In the first forty-five days of the 107th Congress, six bills were
introduced in the Senate or House of Representatives dealing
with standardizing voting procedures across the country.' One of
these bills, entitled the National Election Standards Act of 2001,
introduced by Senator Reid of Nevada, would direct the current
Federal Elections Commission to set uniform national standards for
federal election procedures including for "the type of ballots used"
and the "use of counting machines."'32 The other five bills, which
include proposals introduced into both houses of Congress and
sponsored by members of both major parties, propose forming a new
national commission to study such issues. Two of these bills would
direct the commission to investigate and recommend ways to
implement "standardized voting procedures, including standardized
technology" in federal elections.'33 A third speaks of "the need for
126. Id. at 14.
127. E.g., Kathleen M. Sullivan, One Nation, One Standard Way to Ballot, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 15,2000, atA29; Robert Tanner, Voting Problems Targeted in Florida, Assocn PRESS,
Jan. 12,2001, available at 2001 WL 3652083; Talk of the Nation (NPR radio broadcast, Nov.
29, 2000), available at 2000 WL 21459192.
128. E.g., Rosenberg, supra note 120, at 20.
129. E.g., Patrick Drinan, The real issues in the debate over the Electoral College, SAN
DIEGO UNiON-TRIB., Nov. 16, 2000, at B13.
130. E.g., Sullivan, supra note 127, at A29.
131. See generally Mark Murray, Federal Help On the Way, 32 NAT'LJ., Dec. 2,2000, at
3722. For the particular bills, see infra notes 132-37.
132. National Election Standards Act of 2001, S. 241, 107th Cong. §§ 323(a), (b)(1), (b)(3)
(2001).
133. Commission on the Comprehensive Study of'Voting Procedures Act of 2001, S. 216,
107th Cong. § 4(a)(4) (2001); Commission on Election Procedures Act, H.R. 119,107th Cong.
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uniform standards for the design and maintenance of voting
equipment and technology.""3 4 A fourth bill, introduced on the first
day of the new Congress by a bipartisan coalition of thirty House
members, would specifically charge the commission with reporting
on "the feasibility and advisability of setting uniform national ballot
design and technology standards."' The fifth bill urges commission
consideration of "[ballot design, voting equipment, the methods
employed in counting and recounting votes, and the procedures for
challenging the results.""3 6 Each of these bills raises the prospect of
Congress imposing national election-technology standards and
uniform ballots for federal elections.3 7 This in turn raises the
question of Congress's constitutional power to do so, which is the
subject of our next section.
IV. CONGRESSIONAL POWER TO ENACT PRESIDENTIAL-ELECTION
REFORMS
The presidential-election crisis of 1876 (as Part II reveals)
triggered unprecedented reforms of the presidential-election
system.138 The presidential-election crisis of 2000 (as Part III
reveals) has spurred calls for even more far-reaching action.'" In
the years that followed 1876, congressional debates came to focus
on the scope of congressional power over presidential elections. 140 A
similar debate has begun anew.
This modern debate arises, however, in a setting far removed
from the days of Hayes, Harrison, and Cleveland. Core consti-
tutional verities remain unchanged. Today, as in 1887, Congress
may not tamper with basic state rules about the selection of
presidential electors; it could not, for example, outlaw a state's
§ 4(b)(3) (2001).
134. Election Reform Commission Act of 2001, H.R. 561, 107th Cong. § 4(b)(3) (2001).
135. Federal Elections Review Commission Act, H.R. 57, 107th Cong. § 3(b)(4) (2001).
136. H.R. 430, 107th Cong. § 102(b)(2) (2001).
137. Compare these bills with H.R. 263, 107th Cong. § 102(c)(1)(A) (2001), which speaks
only of "voluntary recommendations adopted by the Commission" that states would be
encouraged to adopt through a federal grant program. Id.
138. See supra Part II.
139. See supra Part Ill.
140. See supra notes 77-78 and accompanying text.
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choice of electors by legislative action, rather than popular vote.
But how, under modern conditions, do we distinguish between those
essential features of a state's "Manner" of "appoint[ing] ... a
Number of Electors"'42 (with which Congress may not meddle) and
lesser interferences (which Congress, if it can point to an autho-
rizing power, may freely pursue)? And what are those authorizing
powers on which Congress might rely to craft presidential-election
rules? One thing is certain: Constitutional developments over
the past 125 years have radically reshaped the landscape of
congressional powers in ways that nineteenth-century political
leaders could not begin to imagine.
There is another profound difference between the reform efforts
of the post-1876 period and the reform efforts of today. The
Electoral Counting Act of 1887 focused on intracongressional
counting of electoral votes." The Act placed no duties on states; nor
did it alter on-the-ground electoral processes. Instead, the Act,
responding to the particular problems that had arisen in 1876,
called on states to establish elector-selection rules in advance,
whatever the substantive content of those rules might be.' In
addition, the Act encouraged timely electoral vote reporting by the
states without seeking to shape the content of any state electoral-
vote-generating processes.'45 Put simply, the Act, to the extent it
concerned the states at all, dealt primarily with the subject of
timing; it addressed when selection rules were to be in place, when
electors were to be identified, and when electoral votes were to be
submitted.'
Because contemporary proposals arise from a different set of
problems, they have a different look. Today's reform efforts focus
directly on how vote casting and vote counting should unfold
within the states.'47 Proposed reforms deal with such matters as
identifying permissible (and impermissible) voting equipment,
legislating substantive standards for counting votes, defining who
141. See infra notes 271-74 and accompanying text.
142. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 2.
143. See supra notes 33, 84-85 and accompanying text.
144. 3 U.S.C. § 5 (2000).
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. E.g., Tanner, supra note 127 (describing various proposals to ameliorate voting
problems raised in the 2000 election).
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may vote, and regulatingwhen polls must close.14 In short, today's
Congress faces a new set of proposed election reforms precipitated
by a new set of problems that have come about in a sharply altered
technological, political, and legal environment. 149 At the same time,
the essential question Congress faces in 2001 is the same one it
faced in 1887-the question of power.
Three matters complicate analysis of congressional power over
presidential elections. First, as Part III reveals, many proposals for
reform now sit on the legislative table. Some of these proposals
would require constitutional amendments; some deal with highly
particularized problems, such as the proper treatment of overseas
absentee ballots; and some deal with important matters that have
little relation to elections themselves, such as limiting federal court
jurisdiction over presidential-election contexts. We deal with this
complexity by focusing on proposals that target two key goals: (1)
nationwide use of a uniform presidential ballot, and (2) nationwide
use of federally approved voting equipment. In the remaining
pages, we touch on other possible reforms, but we concentrate our
attention on these two particularly significant and timely proposals.
Second, analysis of this subject must take account of the different
techniques of regulation Congress might employ. Three techniques
are of particular importance. i0 To begin with, Congress might
prohibit or mandate specified conduct. (A statute might say, for
example: "It shall be unlawful to use any ballot except the national
ballot, and persons promulgating any other ballot shall be fined.")
In addition, Congress might declare that it will not count a state's
electoral votes unless a state satisfies certain requirements. (It
might decree, for example: "Unless a state uses the national ballot,
its electoral votes will not count.") Finally, following the model of
the -Electoral Counting Act of 1887, Congress might refuse the
benefit of an electoral-vote "safe harbor" to states that fail to meet
specified conditions. (Such a law might provide: "A state's electoral
148. See supra notes 122-37 and accompanying text.
149. See, e.g., Katherine Q. Seelye, County in California Touches Future of Voting, N.Y.
TIEs, Feb. 12,2001, atAl (describing touchscreenvotingdevices). See generally supranotes
122-37 and accompanying text.
150. More particularly, these three techniques are important to congressional efforts to
regulate state electoralprocesses in an outright or traditionalway. Afourth technique, which
uses the carrot offederal financial support, is discussed infra notes 354-61 and accompanying
text.
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votes shall be counted if it complies with federal statutory rules,
including use of the national ballot; otherwise its electoral votes
may, or may not, be considered.") For purposes of constitutional
analysis, we see no difference between the first approach (outright
prohibition) and the second approach (refusal to count), for each
form of regulation involves a direct and significant penalty. Nor
would we distinguish the third approach from the other two. Critics
might say that a "Maybe we won't count your votes" rule is self-
evidently different from a rule that says "Certainly we won't count
your votes." Our response is that, as a practical matter, a "maybe"
sanction may have no less of an impact than a parallel "certainly"
sanction if the surrounding circumstances are right. In this context,
because the stakes involve whether to count a state's entire slate of
electoral votes, we believe that safe-harbor laws "pass the point at
which pressure turns into compulsion." 5' For this reason, we would
not distinguish (except perhaps in extraordinary circumstances)
among the outright-prohibition, refusal-to-count, and safe-harbor
approaches to congressional regulation of presidential elections.
151. South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203,211 (1987) (suggesting that conditional spending
programs that, in practical effect, coerce state participation should be evaluated no
differently than outright federal mandates) (internal quotation omitted); see also Anderson
v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 815-16 (1983) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (noting that the role of
electoral college members "may be second to none in importance"). Ifthere is need for further
proof of this assertion, we believe it is supplied by the events surrounding the most recent
presidential contest. This is so because, throughout the fray, attention continually focused
on Florida's compliance with the safe-harbor condition that its electors be determined "at
least six days before the time fixed for the meeting of the electors." 3 U.S.C. § 5 (2000).
Indeed, in the end, a Supreme Court majority declared the presidential election over on the
ground that "[tihe Supreme Court of Florida has said that the [Florida] legislature intended
the State's electors to 'participat[e] fully in the federal electoral process,' as provided in 3
U.S.C. § 5." Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98,110 (2000) (quoting Palm Beach County Canvassing
Bd. v. Harris, 772 So.2d 1220,1237 (Fla. 2000)). More particularly, the Court noted that the
determinative December 12 date set by section 5 "is upon us" and added that "[blecause it
is evident that any recount seeking to meet the December 12 date will be unconstitutional
for the reasons we have discussed, we reverse the judgment of the Supreme Court of Florida
ordering a recount to proceed." Id.; see also id. at 120-21 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring)
(agreeing to discontinue recount because it "jeopardizes the 'legislative wish' to take
advantage of the safe harbor provided by 3 U.S.C. § 5") (quoting Bush v. Palm Beach County
Canvassing Bd., 531 U.S. 98,121 (2000)). Cut to the bone, the Court's reasoningis essentially
this: The State of Florida had so fervently signaled concerns aboutmeeting the section 5 safe-
harbor deadline, that the Court was prepared to declare on its own, as a matter of state law,
the overriding controlling effect of this deadline even in the face of established statutory
violations and uncured constitutional difficulties in the vote-counting process. See id. at 110.
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Finally, any review of federal authority to regulate presidential
elections must deal with each of the powers that Congress might
invoke in this field. As it happens, there are six (or, depending on
how one counts, seven) such powers,'52 each of which requires its
own extensive examination. Focusing on potential national-ballot
and national-voting-equipment legislation, we turn now to that
task.
A. The Commerce Power
In an earlier era, proponents of presidential-election reform in
general, and of national-ballot and voting-equipment legislation in
particular, would have raced to embrace the Commerce Clause of
Article I, Section 8. These reformers would have argued that
each ballot, each voting device, and each counting apparatus helps
to determine who becomes President, that the President plays a
key role in shaping national economic policy, and that national
economic policy greatly affects the movement of goods, services,
capital, and people across state lines. For this reason, supervising
the process of voting for President would fall within the con-
gressional power to "regulate commerce ... among the several
States."'5
3
Nonlawyers might view this reasoning as odd. But students of
post-New Deal constitutional law would find it familiar. Cases like
United States v. Darby54 established that Congress can regulate
activities that "have a substantial effect on interstate commerce."155
Cases like Wickard v. Filburn55 and Perez v. United States157
clarified that a particular regulated act, like the casting of one
ballot by one person, need not itself create a substantial impact;
rather courts should look to the "class of activities"' being
regulated and consider their "total effect."'59 On this analysis,
claims of power to regulate presidential elections based on the
152. See infra note 193.
153. U.S. CoNST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3.
154. 312 U.S. 10 (1941).
155. Id. at 119.
156. 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
157. 402 U.S. 146 (1971).
158. Id. at 152 (emphasis omitted).
159. Darby, 312 U.S. at 123.
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Commerce Clause seem plausible. Our recent election proved, if
nothing else, that poorly regulated individual acts of voting, in the
aggregate, can determine both the presidency and resulting choices
about the direction of national economic policy.
Recent decisions, however, pose two major obstacles to using this
line of analysis to support national-ballot and federally specified
machine laws. First, in Lopez v. United States,6 ' the Court signaled
that Congress may not invoke the aggregation/substantial-effect
technique when it regulates "noncommercial" activities. ' If any act
should qualify as "noncommercial," it is the act of voting. For this
reason, the falling-dominos line of reasoning available prior to
Lopez (each vote helps pick the President, who shapes economic
policy, which fixes the flow of interstate commerce) would seem
unavailable in the post-Lopez world.
Second, in Printz v. United States,16 2 the Court held that
Congress may not, under the commerce power, force state executive
officials to "administer or enforce a federal regulatory program."63
The precise scope of this rule remains unsettled. 16' But forcing state
officials to use federally mandated ballots and voting equipment
would seem on its face to breach the requirement that state officers
not be "'dragooned' into administering federal law." 65
160. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
161. Id. at 566. See generally id. at 559-61 (invalidating congressional prohibition on
possessing guns near schools because the noncommercial nature of this activity precluded
considering its effect "in the aggregate"). The Court again applied this principle in United
States u. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000), to invalidate a federal statutory cause of action for
crimes of violence motivated by gender. The Court inMorrison noted that"we need not adopt
a categorical rule against aggregating the effects of any noneconomic activity in order to
decide these cases." Id. at 613. While the Court thus left open a small crack for advocating
application of the aggregation technique in the vote-regulation context, we see no pressing
reason why the Court would depart from the Lopez rule in this setting in that voting bears
only the most attenuated relationship to purchase-and-sale or other commercial activity.
162. 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
163. Id. at 935.
164. For example, ballot and equipment laws might offend a constitutional principle,
closely related to the rule of Printz, that permits Congress to regulate states pursuant to the
Commerce Clause only "by means of 'generally applicable' laws, or laws that apply to
individuals as well as States." Reno v. Condon, 528 U.S. 141,151 (2000). The Court, however,
has not passed on whether such a rule exists. Id. We leave it to others to explore both that
question and the question of whether such a rule, if it were in fact recognized, would take
hold in this context.
165. Printz, 521 U.S. at 928 (citation omitted). It is possible to argue that ballot and
equipment laws do not violate this principle because they do not call on state officials "to
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These recent precedents render the Commerce Clause of limited
utility in this field.166 Advocates of election reform must therefore
look elsewhere for sources of congressional authority to regulate the
mechanics of presidential elections. Among those sources is Section
5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.
B. The Fourteenth Amendment Enforcement Power
Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment specifies that: "No state
shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor ... deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws."'67 Section 5 adds that "Congress shall have power to enforce
[this article] by appropriate legislation."6 ' In City of Boerne v.
Flores,'69 the Supreme Court held that this enforcement authority
does not give Congress power to decree "the substance of the
Fourteenth Amendment's restrictions on the States."70 Congress
administer or enforce a federal regulatory program." See id. at 935 (emphasis added). On this
argument, Printz is beside the point because it concerned forced state involvement in
regulating private conduct with regard to gun ownership; in contrast, ballot and machine
laws involve direct federal regulation of the state's own behavior in carrying out an aspect
ofits own nonregulatory work. See Condon, 528 U.S. at 150 (noting that in the earlier South
Carolina v. Baker case, 485 U.S. 505 (1998), the Court "upheld a statute that prohibited
States from issuing unregistered bonds because the law 'regulate[d] state activities,' rather
than'seek[ing] to control or influence the manner in which States regulate private parties').
We are most doubtful the Court would buy this argument. Instead we suspect the Court
would deem Condon and Baker inapplicable in this context on the ground that they involved
federal regulation of"[s]tates acting purely as commercial sellers." Id. at 150 n.3. Indeed, it
may well be argued that direct federal control of what might be called the state's own
administrative functions (here in the form of conducting elections) is more of an affront to
local sovereignty than calling on states to participate in otherwise concededly permissible
federal regulatory work. Cf. Coyle v. Smith, 221 U.S. 559, 565 (1911) (suggesting the
unconstitutionality of federal efforts to force a state to relocate its capital). In any event,
voting inescapably involves direct interaction between state officials and private citizens and
concerns how private citizens must act to effectively exercise a legal right. The argument is
strong that the "regulatory" shoe fits in this context, even assuming that it must.
166. For those who find"originalist" reasoningpersuasive, support for this conclusion also
might lie in early understandings of the Commerce Clause. See, e.g., Randy E. Barnett, The
Original Meaning of the Commerce Clause, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 101 (2001).
167. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
168. Id. § 5.
169. 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
170. Id. at 519.
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
could not, for example, simply declare that state employment of
punch-card ballots is a violation of Section 1 and consequently
invoke Section 5 to prohibit their use. The guiding principle is that
Congress may adopt only "remedial and preventive measures
[that] respond to the ... deprivation of constitutional rights" as
defined by judicial rather than legislative authorities.17' Moreover,
laws qualify as "remedial" or "preventive" only if they exhibit
"congruence and proportionality" to identifiable violations of Section
1.172
Despite City of Boerne's restraining definition of the Section 5
power, election-law reformers may gravitate to it for three reasons.
First, the Printz anticommandeering principle does not logically
apply to otherwise proper invocations of Section 5.171 Second, so long
as Congress satisfies the "congruence and proportionality" test,
"[11 egislation which deters or remedies constitutional violations can
fall within the sweep of Congress' enforcement power even if in the
process it prohibits conduct which is not itself unconstitutional."17
Finally, the Court's recent equal protection ruling in Bush v.
Gore expands the range of potential Section 5 legislation in the
presidential-election area.7"
171. Id. at 526; accord Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. College Sav.
Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 639 (1999) (holding that Congress is limited to "remedying or
preventing" forms of "conduct transgressing the Fourteenth Amendment's substantive
provisions").
172. City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 520.
173. The reason is that Section 1, by its terms, targets state action; thus exercises of
Section 5 may (and at least normally must) target state action as well. See United States v.
Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 626 (2000) (faulting congressional invocation of Section 5 to enact
a private cause of action for gender-based violence because it "visits no consequence whatever
on any [state] public official" and "is, therefore, unlike any of the section 5 remedies that we
have previously upheld"). Indeed, the main exercises of congressional powers under the Civil
Rights Amendments that the Court has upheld in the past have concerned federal controls
of state election rules. City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156 (1980); Katzenbach v.
Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966); South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966). See
generally EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226,243 n.18 (1983) (reaflirming that, "when properly
exercising its power under § 5, Congress is not limited by the same Tenth Amendment
constraints that circumscribe the exercise of its Commerce Clause powers") (citation
omitted), superseded by 29 U.S.C. § 623 (1994 & Supp. V 1999).
174. City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 518.
175. Of course, reforms under Section 5 that build on Bush v. Gore need not be limited to
voting for presidential electors because "there is nothing in the Court's opinion that suggests
any reason the Equal Protection concerns it announces are limited to Presidential elections,
nor is there any reason to think these concerns should be limited to that one electional
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In Bush v. Gore, the Court focused on problems created by punch-
card voting in finding that a lack of consistency in Florida's
hand-recount standards violated Section 1 of the Fourteenth
Amendment. 7 6 The joint operation of Section 5 and Bush v. Gore
thus would permit Congress to pass at least some forms of
legislation concerning punch-card ballots, manual recounts, and
perhaps other matters as well. In seeking to prevent future
constitutional violations in hand-recount processes, could Congress
go so far as to insist that states use specified modern voting
techniques, not including punch-card ballots? In our view, such a
law (while justifiable under other congressional powers) would
probably violate Section 5's proportionality mandate. Three reasons
indicate why.
First, such a law (unless it authorized all forms of voting except
by way of punch-card ballots) would be significantly overinclusive
with regard to the voting equipment it outlawed. If the federal law
were to authorize only ATM-like computerized voting machines,
for example, 77 it would preclude use of punch-card-ballot and other
methodologies as well. Problems in Florida arose, however, because
of punch-card ballots.'78 A de facto prohibition on a wider range
of vote collection methods thus would seem to go well beyond
remedying and preventing the constitutional problem that underlay
Bush v. Gore.
Second, even assuming that the national law targeted only
punch-card ballots, there is reason to doubt that this sort of ballot
has routinely spawned constitutional problems outside Florida. In
fact, the core problem in Florida-that is, the lack of "adequate
statewide standards for determining what is a legal vote"l 9-may
not have surfaced in other states precisely because those states
already have such standards in place.180 In addition, a universal
prohibition on punch-card balloting would take hold even in those
states where potentially troublesome hand recounts were either
context." SAM-EL ISSACHAROFF ET AL., WHEN ELECTIONS GO BAD 48 (2001).
176. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 104-09 (2000).
177. See supra note 128 and accompanying text.
178. Bush, 531 U.S. at 104-05.
179. Id. at 110.
180. E.g., TEX. ELEC. CODEANN. § 127.130 (Vernon 1986 & Supp. 2001) (describingwhen
partial detachment of a chad will count as a vote).
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unavailable or available only in unusual circumstances. An equip-
ment rule that flatly banned all punch-card ballots thus would not
seem to be geographically proportionate to any fairly identified
constitutional wrong.''
Finally, even in Florida itself, voting authorities could deal with
the constitutional problems posed by punch-card manual recounts
without requiring wholesale abandonment of punch-card balloting.
To repeat: Constitutional problems arose in Florida because the
state failed to establish "uniform rules to determine intent" in
hand-recounting votes.8 2 Solving this problem does not require
wholesale elimination of punch-card ballots. Rather, it requires
only that "uniform rules" be established. For this reason, a federal
statute that in effect bars all use of punch-card ballots would (at
least absent new and extensive supportive congressional findings)
be "out of proportion" to the lack-of-standards constitutional prob-
lem that actually arose in the 2000 election."a
There may be, however, a substantive Fourteenth Amendment
violation, separate and apart from this lack-of-uniform-standards
problem, which justifies sweeping congressional voting-equipment
legislation. Drawing on Bush v. Gore and the one-person, one-vote
jurisprudence on which it relied,'84 it might be argued that the
181. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598,616 (2000) (emphasizing in invalidating
claimed use of Section 5 on proportionality grounds that "Congress' findings indicate that the
problem of discrimination against the victims of gender-motivated crimes does not exist in
all States, or even most States").
182. Bush, 531 U.S. at 106.
183. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 532 (holding a federal statute
unconstitutional for being "so out of proportion to a supposed remedial object that it cannot
be understood as responsive to, or designed to prevent, unconstitutional behavior").
Particularly informative in this regard is the Florida Prepaid case, Florida Prepaid
Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. College Say. Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (1999). There the Court
reasoned that Congress could not make states generally liable for patent infringement to
remedy or prevent state deprivations of patent property made without due process of law.
Id. at 641-48. One reason given by the Court was that state infringements might well be
negligent, even though a constitutional violation would require "intentional or reckless
infringement." Id. at 645. Put another way, the statutory solution to the constitutional
problem involved in Florida Prepaid simply reached too far. In light of the less-restrictive
alternative available to counter the constitutional problem identified in Bush v. Gore (in the
form of adoption of uniform recount rules), a wholesale statutory ban on punch-card ballots
would be vulnerable to the same disproportionality attack.
184. See Bush, 531 U.S. at 105 (relying on Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964)); id. at
107 (relying on Moore v. Ogilvie, 394 U.S. 814 (1969), and endorsing Moore's assertion that
'[tihe idea that one group can be granted greater voting strength than another is hostile to
884
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Equal Protection Clause prohibits "variations in voting machines"
within any single state, at least if those variations produce
significantly different uncounted ballot percentages.185 We doubt
that such a constitutional rule exists. 86 Even if it does, however,
the proportionality limitation again would block a nationwide
mandate to use only particular voting technologies (for example,
optical scanners or computerized voting machines). After all,
there is no Fourteenth Amendment mandate of equal treatment
of voters on a nationwide basis. 87 Moreover, Congress could
address any intrastate discrimination problems that result from
voting equipment variations simply by insisting upon intrastate
uniformity in machine selection, without specifying which equip-
ment states must use. Because such an obviously less restrictive
tool for securing intrastate uniformity is available, our hypo-
thetical computerized-voting-only law would seem to fail the
"proportionality" test.8
8
Just as surely as Section 5 would not support a congressional
mandate that all states use specified voting equipment, Section 5
would not permit Congress to force states to use a uniform ballot
for presidential and other national-office elections. Again, the
Fourteenth Amendment does not require that voters in all states be
the one man, one vote basis of our representative government").
185. See ISSACHAROFF ET AL., supra note 175, at 48.
186. The reason is that any such equal equipment rule would logically derive from the
district-population-discrepancy principle that underlies the so-called "one person, one vote"
principle to the extent it applies to presidential elections. Moore, 394 U.S. at 819. Yet we see
a number of significant distinctions between the equipment-discrepancy and population-
discrepancy cases. For example, vote dilution automatically occurs for each voter assigned
to high-population voting districts, whereas no automatic dilution of any individual's vote
occurs in "bad equipment" districts. (This is so because most voters in such districts cast
votes that are counted fully and equally with those of other voters in the state. Moreover,
voters presumably can ensure a full count of their votes in a bad equipment district by
completing the ballot with care.) In addition, bad equipment problems are at least partially
curable by way of manual recounts; there is no similar "fix," however, for residents of high-
population districts. Cf ISSACHAROFF ETAL., supra note 175, at 49 (suggesting distinctions
between "differential equipment" cases and "differential vote counting" cases like Bush v.
Gore).
187. The Fourteenth Amendment says only that "[n]o State shall.., deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1
(emphasis added). See generally ISSACHAROFFETAL., supra note 175, at 25 (noting that there
is no constitutional requirement of "national uniformity in national elections").
188. See supra note 183 (discussing the Florida Prepaid case).
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treated equally."9 Moreover, although some differences in dis-
qualification of votes may result from the use of a variety of ballots
within a state, 9 ° the Supreme Court in Bush v. Gore was careful to
avoid drawing into question traditional practices whereby "local
entities, in the exercise of their expertise, may develop different
systems for implementing elections.""'9 Finally, even assuming that
an equal protection violation might arise from use of nonuniform
ballots within a single state, the specification of a nationwide ballot,
once again, would not be a "proportional" remedy. Rather, Congress
could solve any problem simply by requiring that each state
formulate its own unitary ballot for state-wide use.' 92 In short,
neither national-ballot nor national-equipment legislation seems to
be sustainable under the Section 5 power.' 93
189. See supra note 187 and accompanying text.
190. The point is well-illustrated by Palm Beach County's use of the controversial
"Butterfly Ballot" in the 2000 election. See supra notes 122-26 and accompanying text.
191. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 109 (2000).
192. See supra note 183 and accompanying text.
193. Advocates of presidential-election law reforms might invoke the Fourteenth
Amendment in another way that has little connection to Bush v. Gore. The argument turns
on the thought that, wholly apart from the Equal Protection Clause, "[tihe right to vote for
national officers is aprivilege and immunity ofnational citizenship" under Section 1, Oregon
v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 149 (1970) (Douglas, J., concurring) (emphasis added), superseded
by U.S. CONST. amend. XXVI, and thus is subject to congressional enforcement both under
and apart from Section 5. See 1 LAURENCEH. TRIBE,,AmRICANCONSTITUTIONALLAW § 5-18,
at 964 (3d ed. 2000). To be sure, the Court indicated inBreedlove u. Suttles, 302 U.S. 277,283
(1937), that a state poll tax did not abridge "any privilege or immunity protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment" because the voting right "is not derived from the United States, but
is conferred by the State." However, Breedlove was overruled (albeit on other grounds) in
Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966), and United States v. Classic, 313
U.S. 299, 315 (1941) signaled that the right to vote for federal legislators (even in primaries)
is a privilege and immunity of national citizenship. See Oregon, 400 U.S. at 213 (Harlan, J.,
dissenting) (reading Classic to establish that "the right of qualified electors to cast their
ballots and to have their votes counted" is "a privilege of citizenship").
Even if the privileges and immunities of national citizenship extend to the right to vote
for presidential electors, however, it does not follow that Congress can pass any legislation
whatsoever on that subject. In particular, it is one thing to outlaw the sort of willful and
blatant interferences with the votes that were involved inExparte Yarbrough, 110 U.S. 651
(1884), and Classic and quite another thing to regulate voting ballots and equipment
regardless of whether they were consciously put in place to impede the right to have one's
vote count. See, e.g., United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 759-60 (1966) (allowing federal
prosecution under 18 U.S.C. § 241 for interference with"the constitutional right of interstate
travel" only if that interference was undertaken with "[a] specific intent to interfere with the
federal right"). We recognize that any power to protect the "right of qualified electors to cast
their ballots and to have their votes counted," Oregon, 400 U.S. at 213 (Harlan, J.,
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The question thus arises whether there is some source of power
apart from Section 5 that authorizes Congress to adopt a law that
requires a uniform national ballot or requires uniform voting
equipment. At least one distinguished commentator has indicated
that there is not.'94 We are more sanguine and turn now to
explaining why.
C. The Implied Congressional Power to Regulate Presidential
Elections
There is a tectonic tension built into the Constitution's treatment
of presidential elections. This tension arises because Article II gives
each state the power to fix the "Manner" for appointing its
presidential electors.' 95 Yet the business being regulated is the
election of federal officials-indeed, the highest-ranking officials of
the Republic. Does this latter fact give rise to some measure of
power in the national legislature to regulate the processes of
selecting presidential electors?
The Court planted the seed for recognizing such a power in Ex
parte Yarbrough,' which involved a federal prosecution under
Reconstruction-era legislation for impeding the exercise of voting
rights in connection with a federal election. Although the
dissenting), might be broadly conceived. Cf. id. at 286 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (noting that
congressional power to implement "privileges of United States citizenship" exists apart from
Section 5 and embraces "all of (Congress's] power under the Necessary and Proper Clause";
endorsing congressional override of state durational residency requirements for voting in
presidential elections on ground that their imposition "burdens and sanctions" the federal
right to move from state to state); id. at 292 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (speaking of Congress's
"power to facilitate the citizen's exercise of his constitutional privilege"); id. at 150 (Douglas,
J., concurring) (stating that 'choice of means' to protect such a privilege [of national
citizenship] presents 'a question primarily addressed to the judgment of Congress'"). Beyond
this, however, we leave it to others to consider what congressional powers might flow from
any national citizenship-based "privilege and immunity" to vote in presidential elections. We
note only that such a power, if it exists at all, most likely would not reach beyond Congress's
power under Burroughs v. United States, 290 U.S. 534 (1934), to regulate presidential
elections to the extent suggested below. Cf Oregon, 400 U.S. at 286 (Stewart, J., dissenting)
(citing Burroughs in discussing Congress's power to safeguard the "privileges of United
States citizenship"); id. at 150 (Douglas, J., concurring) (same).
194. See Sullivan, supra note 127, at A29 (noting that "we could readily nationalize our
election procedures without abolishing the Electoral College," but that this step "would
require a constitutional amendment").
195. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 2.
196. 110 U.S. 651 (1884).
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indictment in Yarbrough concerned only a congressional (rather
than a presidential) election,'97 the Court spoke broadly of the
federal government's "power to protect the elections on which its
existence depends from violence and corruption,""' as well as its
"duty" to ensure that federal office holders are in fact "the free
and uncorrupted choice of those who have the right to take part in
that choice."'99 Drawing on this structural reasoning, the Court
in Burroughs v. United States invoked the federal government's
inherent "power of self protection"2 0 to uphold a congressional act
that mandated public disclosures by multistate organizations that
accepted contributions or made expenditures with the purpose of
influencing presidential elections.201
As the Court explained:
The congressional act under review seeks to preserve the purity
of presidential and vice presidential elections .... It deals with
political committees organized for the purpose of influencing
elections in two or more states ... and excludes from its
operation state or local committees. Its operation, therefore, is
confined to situations which, if not beyond the power of the state
to deal with at all, are beyond its power to deal with
adequately. 20 2
The Court continued:
197. Id. at 655-57; see also Burroughs, 290 U.S. at 546 (noting this point).
198. Yarbrough, 110 U.S. at 658.
199. Id. at 662; see id. at 665 (citing "the power of Congress" to protect "the right to vote
in general" as well as "the right to be protected against discrimination"); see also United
States v. Original Knights of the KK, 250 F. Supp. 330, 353 (E.D. La. 1965) (stating that
the power implied in Ex parte Yarbrough arises out of "necessity" that the federal
government has power to safeguard elections of its officers). Yarbrough's reasoning extended
fully to elections of both the "executive head and legislative body." Yarbrough, 110 U.S. at
657; see also Rosenthal, supra note 30, at 33 (noting that "[w]hile the indictment in
Yarbrough involved only a congressional election and was based on intimidation of Negro
voters-undoubtedly a special case under the fifteenth amendment-the reasoning of the
Court went much further").
200. Burroughs, 290 U.S. at 545.
201. Rosenthal, supra note 30, at 35 (noting "inherent" nature of power discussed in
Yarbrough and Burroughs); Kevin K. Green, Note, A Vote Properly Cast? The
Constitutionality of the National Voter Registration Act of 1993, 22 J. LEGIS. 45, 70 (1996)
(noting that the Court in Burroughs did not invoke a textual grant of power in upholding the
challenged statute).
202. Burroughs, 290 U.S. at 544-45.
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The President is vested with the executive power of the nation.
The importance of his election and the vital character of its
relationship to and effect upon the welfare and safety of the
whole people cannot be too strongly stated. To say that Congress
is without power to pass appropriate legislation to safeguard
such an election from the improper use of money to influence the
result is to deny to the nation in a vital particular the power of
self protection. Congress, undoubtedly, possesses that power, as
it possesses every other power essential to preserve the
departments and institutions of the general government from
impairment or destruction, whether threatened by force or by
corruption.0 3
After quoting extensively from Yarbrough (including its
expressions of worry that "the very sources of [federal] power may
be poisoned by corruption or controlled by violence and outrage"
absent any congressional oversight of national elections2 4 ) the
Court ruled that "[t]hese excerpts are enough to control the present
case."20 5 It concluded:
The power of Congress to protect the election of President and
Vice President from corruption being clear, the choice of means
to that end presents a question primarily addressed to the
judgment of Congress. If it can be seen that the means adopted
are really calculated to attain the end, the degree of their
necessity, the extent to which they conduce to the end, the
closeness of the relationship between the means adopted and the
end to be attained, are matters for congressional determination
alone. Congress reached the conclusion that public disclosure of
political contributions, together with the names of contributors
and other details, would tend to prevent the corrupt use of
money to affect elections.... [Ilt seems plain that the statute as
a whole is calculated to discourage the making and use of
contributions for purposes of corruption.Y
203. Id. at 545.
204. Id. at 547 (quoting Yarbrough, 110 U.S. at 667).
205. Id.
206. Id. at 547-48 (citation omitted).
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Does the implied election supervisory power recognized almost
eighty years ago in Burroughs support national-ballot and national-
voting-equipment laws today? Four separate arguments suggest
that the answer to this question is no. We believe, however, that the
answer is yes and turn now to explaining why.
1. The Active-Cheating Distinction
One way of attempting to distinguish a would-be national-
ballot/national-voting-equipment case from Burroughs derives
from the Court's repeated references in that case to concerns
about "violence," "corruption," and "fraud.""7 The argument for
distinguishing the cases rests on a simple syllogism that draws
upon the Court's focus on these forms of willful obstruction and
abuse:
Major Premise: The Burroughs power authorizes federal
regulation only of active cheating in the presidential selection
process.2os
207. Id. at 546.
208. See, e.g., Igartua de la Rosa v. United States, 113 F. Supp. 2d 228,239 & n.4 (D.P.R.
2000) (suggesting that Burroughs power does not reach further than authorizing control of
"fraud and corruption"), rev'd on other grounds, 229 F.3d 80 (1st Cir. 2000); Victor Williams
& Alison M. MacDonald, Rethinking Article II, Section 1 and its Twelfth Amendment
Restatement: Challenging OurNation's Malapportioned, Undemocratic Presidential Election
Systems, 77 MAnQ. L. REV. 201, 247 n.276 (1994) (citing Burroughs as creating "power of
Congress to ensure that the process of choosing electors is not fraudulent or corrupt");
Elisabeth M. Gillooly, Comment, Larouche v. Kezer A Cursory Look at Connecticut's
Hopelessly Vague Media Recognition Statute, 15 QUINNIPIAC L. REv. 269, 274 n.28 (1995)
(reading Burroughs to permit Congress "to prevent destruction in its institutions");
Developments in the Law: Elections, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1111, 1243-44 (1975) (reading
Burroughs as permitting "the federal government to preserve its elections from impairment
'by force or by corruption'"; noting that Burroughs focused on "vote buying, which was
likened to physical coercion at the polls"). Rhetoric in some Supreme Court authorities may
be read to support this narrower view. See, e.g., Yarbrough, 110 U.S. at 661 ("Can it be
doubted that Congress can, by law, protect the act ofvoting.. .from corruption and fraud?");
id. at 662 (insisting that the federal government should guard against "the adverse influence
of force and fraud"); id. at 666 (noting "the temptations to control these elections by violence
and by corruption" and expressing fear that unless Congress has "authority to provide
against these evils ... the very sources of power may be poisoned by corruption or controlled
byviolence and outrage"); see also Brown v. Socialist Workers '74 Campaign Comm., 459 U.S.
87, 95 (1982) (asserting that campaign finance disclosure laws "ten[d] to 'prevent the corrupt
use of money to affect elections.'") (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam)
and Burroughs v. United States, 290 U.S. 534 (1934)). Particularly suggestive along these
890 [Vol. 43:851
20021 CONGRESSIONAL POWER OVER PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS 891
Minor Premise: National ballot and equipment legislation would
have no real connection to addressing active cheating.
Conclusion: The Burroughs power does not support national
ballot and equipment legislation.
Put another way, an ability to regulate interference with
elections by way of active cheating inheres in the federal polity's
"power of self protection."2 °9 But any right of "self protection" does
not readily support a government power to counter mere voter
confusion and mechanical-counting errors. These are the goals
(so the argument goes) that drive proposed national-ballot and
voting-equipment enhancement reforms. Because these reforms do
not "protect the election of President and Vice President from
corruption"21 (so the argument continues), they fall outside the
Burroughs power.
One response to this claimed distinction would build on post-
Burroughs authorities. In particular, both courts and legal writers
have suggested that the Burroughs power is fully coextensive with
Congress's sweeping authority21' to regulate in any way the
"Manner" of House and Senate elections.2 12 If this parallel in fact
lines is Chief Justice Burger's dissenting opinion in Buckley, in which he endorsed the
principle of Burroughs, but asserted that that principle focused on "elimination of the
appearance and reality of corrupting influences" because they constitute "[s]erious dangers
to the very processes of government." Buckley, 424 U.S. at 236. The Chief Justice refused to
find disclosure requirements justifiable under Burroughs if adopted merely for "broad
informational purposes, enabling the public to be fully informed." Id.
209. Burroughs, 290 U.S. at 545.
210. Id. at 547 (emphasis added).
211. See generally infra notes 264-87 and accompanying text.
212. Voting Rights Coalition v. Wilson, 60 F.3d 1411, 1414 (9th Cir. 1995) (citing
Burroughs in stating that"[tihe broad power given to Congress over congressional elections
has been extended to presidential elections"); Association of Cmty. Orgs. for Reform Now v.
Edgar, 56 F.3d 791, 793 (7th Cir. 1995); Bruce D. Brown, Alien Donors: The Participation of
Non-Citizens in the U.S. Campaign Finance System, 15 YALE L. & POLY REV. 503, 524-25
n.98 (1997) (citing Burroughs for proposition that congressional-elections and presidential-
elections powers are "coextensive"); Eugene Gressman, Uniform Timing of Presidential
Primaries, 65 N.C. L. REV. 351, 355 (1987) (noting that the "Court employs the same ...
broad treatment of vested congressional power" with respect to congressional control of both
congressional and presidential elections); Matthew M. Hoffman, The Illegitimate President:
Minority Vote Dilution and the Electoral College, 105 YALE L.J. 935,973 n.177 (1996) (noting
that courts in both Association of Community Organizations for Reform Now and Voting
Rights Coalition "specifically held that congressional power to regulate presidential elections
is coextensive with its power to regulate congressional elections under Article I"); Green,
supra note 201, at 70 (asserting "that where not specifically constrained by the Constitution,
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exists, national-ballot and voting-equipment controlling legislation
clearly is permissible because the way in which votes are cast and
counted indubitably involves "the ... Manner" of conducting a
popular election.213
We are not at all sure, however, that these authorities are correct
in concluding that Burroughs recognizes a power with respect to
presidential elections that reaches as far as Congress's broad
textual authority to control the "Manner" of House and Senate
elections. Neither Burroughs nor any later Supreme Court case
made such a pronouncement,214 and it may well be that a specific
and express grant of power to control the manner of legislative
elections is in logic more robust than an implied grant that flows
from an ill-defined right of national "self-protection."21 5 For two
separate reasons, however, we believe the Burroughs power-even
if less far-reaching than Congress's authority under Article I,
Section 4-is broad enough to support national-ballot and voting-
equipment legislation.
First, in our view, such legislation could be sustained even under
the narrow "active cheating" reading of Burroughs because it would
congressional power to regulate elections for President and Vice President is no less
expansive than that Congress enjoys under the Elections Clause"); Susanna M. Zwerling,
Note, Reclaiming a Public Resource: The Constitutionality of Requiring Broadcasters to
Provide Free TelevisionAdvertising Time to Candidates for Federal Office, 18 N.Y.U. REV. L.
& Soc. CHANGE 213,217 (1991) (claiming that Burroughs "extended" federal authority over
the times, places and manner of holding congressional elections "to include presidential
elections").
213. See generally infra notes 264-87 and accompanying text.
214. Hoffman, supra note 212, at 973 n.177 (noting that "Burroughs... does not appear
to provide any strong support" for coextensive treatment of "congressional power to regulate
presidential... [and congressional elections"). To be sure, Justice Black stated in Oregon v.
Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112,124 (1970), superseded by U.S. CONST. amend XXVI, that "[it cannot
be seriously contended that Congress has less power over the conduct of presidential
elections than it has over congressional elections." Justice Black, however, was the sole
member of the Court to make this claim because his opinion expressed only "his own view
of the cases." Id. at 117. But cf. O'Brien v. Brown, 409 U.S. 1, 15 (1972) (Marshall, J., joined
by Douglas, J., dissenting) (quoting this passage from Justice Black's opinion with approval;
noting that Justice Black supported it by relying on Burroughs; and describing "Justice
Black's analysis" as "decisive" in the Oregon case). Notably, commentators sometimes
incorrectly attribute the views of Justice Black in Oregon v. Mitchell to the entire Court. See
Leonard P. Stark, Note, The Presidential Primary and Caucus Schedule: A Role for Federal
Regulation?, 15 YALE L. & POLY REV. 331, 376 (1996).
215. Hoffman, supra note 212, at 973 n.177 (suggesting that Burroughs power does not
reach to the full scope of Congress's power over House and Senate elections).
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help guard against corruption by local election officials. A national
ballot, for example, might well frustrate efforts to construct local
ballots designed (1) to advantage one candidate over others for
impermissible reasons, (2) to facilitate favoritism in the counting or
recounting process, or (3) to confound double-checking conducted to
discover fraud. Equipment laws likewise could provide useful tools
to guard against electoral chicanery. The clear and accurate
counting of ballots in the first instance will always reduce later
opportunities to "fudge" returns. And Congress could readily find
that certain types of equipment deter fraud by facilitating effective
audits.21
6
To be sure, ballot and equipment laws do not target fraud and
corruption directly. They need not do so, however, because
Burroughs requires only that these laws provide meaningful
prophylaxes. After all, in Burroughs itself, the Court did not
confront an outright congressional ban on vote-buying or bribery.217
Rather, the law upheld in that case indirectly guarded against
these evils by mandating campaign-contribution and campaign-
216. See, e.g., Bruce Ackerman, Anatomy of a Constitutional Coup, LONDON REV. OF
BOOKS, Feb. 8, 2001, at 3. Professor Ackerman notes, for example, that the "selection of
equipment is delegated to local election boards" in all but eight states, and adds that "the
dangers of partisan appointment to election boards are ... real." Id. Speaking of the recent
election battle in Florida, Professor Ackerman asserts that Florida's Secretary of State, who
"suffer[edj from an obvious conflict of interest," acted "to block, delay or nullify any manual
recounts that threatened Bush's diminishing lead." Id. at 5. He also asserts that, as Miami's
"election board prepared for a manual recount, a Republican mob successfully intimidated
them into calling it quits." Id. at 3, 5. Whatever one might think about the accuracy of these
claims, one thing is certain-to the extent that the potential for mischief existed in Florida,
itwas primarily the result ofuncertainty generating ballots and machines. See, e.g., Gore v.
Harris, 773 So.2d 524, 530 (Fla. 2000) (Shaw, J., concurring) (noting that "we routinely
installed outdated and defective voting systems and tabulating equipment at our polls prior
to the present election"); Ackerman, supra, at 3 (noting that more than 10,000 ballots were
rejected in Miami "by the city's pathetically inadequate voting technology"). It is also worth
recalling that the difficulties created by the failings of such electoral systems may affect the
outcome of no small number ofpresidential elections. See Rosenthal, supra note 30, at I n.3
& 7 (noting the razor-thin closeness of popular votes in election determining states in 1884,
1888, 1948, and 1960; noting also that "an infinitesimal shift of votes would have reversed
the result" in "five successive elections from 1876 through 1892").
217. United States v. Original Knights of the KKK, 250 F. Supp. 330,353 (E.D. La. 1965)
(noting that "Burroughs is one of a number of cases dealing with corrupt election practices
which go far beyond the act of voting in an election").
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expenditure disclosures.218 Ballot and equipment laws are consti-
tutional because, in a similarly causative way, they operate to
discourage, deter, and disclose active wrongdoing in the electoral
process."' At least the Court could not dismiss this assertion as
farfetched; it should therefore uphold these laws because "the
relationship between the means adopted and the end to be attained,
are matters for congressional determination alone.22
Even assuming that our active-cheating-control arguments do not
carry the day, we would uphold ballot-and-equipment legislation
under Burroughs because we believe that the power recognized in
that case should be more broadly conceived. 221 Burroughs by its
terms suggests that federal legislation should stand if it genuinely
"seeks to preserve the purity of presidential and vice presidential
elections."222 In Oregon v. Mitchell,228 Justice Black drew on such
passages to recognize "a residual power in Congress to insure that
[the highest federal] officers represent their national constituency
as responsively as possible."224 Such a power logically reaches
beyond prevention and punishment of outright corruption. 5
Indeed, ensuring that the President represents the national
constituency "as responsively as possible" requires, at its core, an
218. Burroughs v. United States, 290 U.S. 534, 542 (1934) (citing pertinent sections of the
Federal Corrupt Practices Act).
219. See supra note 216 and accompanying text.
220. Burroughs, 290 U.S. at 548 (emphasis added).
221. See, e.g., Joseph R. Biden, Jr., Public Financing of Elections: Legislative Proposals
and Constitutional Questions, 69 Nw. U. L. REv. 1, 46-47 (1974) (describing language of
Burroughs as "broad" and adding that "constitutional provisions dealing with the regulation
of elections have ... been broadly construed").
222. Burroughs, 290 U.S. at 544 (emphasis added); see also Original Knights of KKK, 250
F. Supp. at 353 (suggesting that Yarbrough rests on"the transcendent interest of the federal
government" to legislate against activities that have "alloyed the purity of the federal
political process"); Gressman, supra note 212, at 356 (concluding that Burroughs vested
Congress with broad power to preserve the purity of the presidential elections).
223. 400 U.S. 112 (1970).
224. Id. at 124 n.7; see id. at 134 (reiterating that the national government has "power ...
to insure that the officials who fill [federal elective] offices are as responsive as possible to
the will of the people whom they represent"; thus "the Federal Government... [has] the final
control of the elections of its own officers").
225. See id. at 291 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (suggesting that Burroughs gives Congress
power to assure both that presidential elections are "free from corruption" and that they are
"orderly"); Stark, supra note 214, at 376 (asserting that "Congress's broad authority" under
Burroughs would permit it to regulate the timing of presidential primaries and caucuses
because of "problems associated with the disproportionate influence of early states").
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assurance that the candidate who actually won the election be
declared the winner. 226 Federal office holders simply cannot be
trusted to represent constituents "responsively" if they are placed
in office by a process that frustrates the wishes of the governing
electorate.227 And a person's sacred vote is no more a vote if it is
excluded from fair consideration by dysfunctional equipment than
by dishonorable vote counters.2 We thus read Burroughs to
authorize meaningful congressional efforts to ensure the basic
accuracy, and thus the essential integrity, of vote counting in
presidential elections. Put another way, if "[ilt is ... essential to the
successful working of this government that the great organisms of
its executive and legislative branches should be the free choice of
the people,"229 it is no less essential that those representatives
should be the actual choice of the people.2
0
Is there modern judicial authority that supports this view of the
Burroughs power? There is. 231 In 1993, Congress adopted the
National Voter Registration Act,232 more commonly known as the
"Motor Voter Law," and thereby forced states to broaden oppor-
tunities for voters to register for federal elections. In upholding this
enactment, lower courts drew no distinction between registration
226. See, e.g., Original Knights ofthe KKK, 250 F. Supp. at 355 ("The foundation of our
form of government is the consent of the governed.'") (quoting United States v. Wood, 295
F.2d 772 (5th Cir. 1961)).
227. E.g., Rosenthal, supra note 30, at 35 (suggesting that the Burroughs power centers
on "effectuation of the voters' wishes").
228. Id. ("But of what avail is it to be able to protect a voter against interference with the
casting or counting of his ballot in the first stage of the process-the choosing of electors-if
Congress cannot ensure that his vote will be effective in the election of the President?"); see
also United States v. Mosley, 238 U.S. 383,386 (1915) (noting that"[w]e regard it as equally
unquestionable that the right to have one's vote counted is as open to protection by Congress
as the right to put a ballot in a box"). See generally Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 555
(1964) ("The right to vote freely for the candidate of one's choice is of the essence of a
democratic society, and any restrictions on that right strike at the heart of representative
government.").
229. Exparte Yarbrough, 110 U.S. 651, 666 (1884).
230. See Oregon, 400 U.S. at 134 (finding congressional legislation with respect to
absentee ballots for presidential and other federal elections permissible because "Congress
was attempting to insure a fully effective voice to all citizens in national elections").
231. E.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 519 F.2d 821,926 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (asserting that"Burroughs
... holds that the congressional power to protect the sanctity of elections extends to the
selection of presidential electors") , affd in part and rev'd in part, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per
curiam).
232. 42 U.S.C. § 1973gg (1994 & Supp. V 1999).
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for congressional and presidential races.233 Nor did they require
Congress to show that the Motor Voter Law countered corruption
and active fraud. Thus the argument from authority is made. If
Congress has power under Burroughs to regulate state registration
practices to facilitate, broaden, and ease full voter participation in
presidential elections, it should likewise possess power to adopt a
national-ballot law and an election-equipment mandate to achieve
precisely those same ends.
2. The Printz Problem
This discussion suggests that the Burroughs power is broad
enough to support national-ballot and voting-equipment legislation.
Whenever Congress exercises one of its powers, however, the
question arises whether its action offends an "external restraint"
that emanates from other provisions of the Constitution." We
identified one such restraint, the anticommandeering principle of
Printz v. United States,"' in our earlier discussion of the Commerce
Clause.3 ' The argument is predictable that the Printz rule should
trump not only exercises of the commerce power, but also any claim
of authority to enact ballot or equipment legislation under the
principle of Burroughs. According to this argument, one can
distinguish any ballot-and-equipment law from the law at issue in
Burroughs itself because the latter law involved only a requirement
that private citizens file disclosure forms with federal authorities.
Forcing state election officials to use national ballots and specified
voting equipment does not involve a regulation of the conduct of
private citizens. Rather, the very purpose and essential effect of
such regulation is "to direct the functioning of the state executive,"
despite the teachings of Printz.217
Does the principle of Printz apply in this context? One argument
for its application is straightforward: If the Printz rule trumps
233. See supra note 212 (citing leading cases).
234. E.g., Buckley, 424 U.S. at 135 (noting the constraint based on presidential
appointment authority that may override congressional attempts to regulate federal elections
under the Necessary and Proper Clause).
235. 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
236. See supra notes 162-65 and accompanying text.
237. Printz, 521 U.S. at 932.
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congressional exercises of its expressly granted Commerce Clause
power (as it plainly does), then it a fortiori should trump exercises
of an implied power to regulate presidential elections."' Moreover,
some passages inPrintz (and in the historical record said to support
it) bolster the contention that its rule applies (at least in the
absence of a textual exception) to exercises of congressional power
as a general matter. 9
Do these arguments and materials mean that the Printz rule
preempts otherwise proper exercises of the Burroughs power that
take the form of mandates to the states? We think not. To begin
with, Printz (like its doctrinal predecessor, New York v. United
States24 ) focused on the constitutionality of federal legislation
enacted under the Commerce Clause.241 The results in these cases
were thus explicable in terms of history and policy: they reflected
the understandable efforts of no small number of earlier decisions
242
to confine the distinctively (if not infinitely) elastic power to
regulate any activities of any kind that, in the aggregate, affect
interstate commerce.24' The broad potential such a power holds for
stripping away state authority, however, simply is not presented by
a power that focuses solely and narrowly on federal control of
federal elections. In addition, it seems reasonable on the face of
things to say that exercises of the commerce power should focus on
those individuals or groups who actually engage in commerce; the
regulation of elections, in contrast, inescapably involves placing
duties on government officials because they conduct elections.2
238. See supra note 201 (discussing implied nature of the Burroughs power). In Prigg v.
Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539 (1842), the Court provided some support for this position,
declaring that "the national government, in the absence of all positive provisions to the
contrary, is bound, through its own proper departments... to carry into effect all the rights
and duties imposed upon it by the constitution." Id. at 616 (emphasis added).
239. See, e.g., Green, supra note 201, at 78 ("Nowhere is the [Printz] holding explicitly
limited to the Commerce Clause. Nor should it be: the underlying rationale of the case is no
less applicable to most other grants of federal power.").
240. 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
241. Printz, 521 U.S. at 899-900.
242. E.g., National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976), overruled by Garcia v.
San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985); Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S.
238 (1936); Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918), overruled inpart by United States
v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
243. See supra notes 154-59 and accompanying text.
244. See Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371 (1879) (rejecting anticommandeering argument
directed at federal law that controlled state election officials); Green, supra note 201, at 68
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Finally, the power of "self-protection" that gave rise to the
Burroughs decision constitutes (at least in substantial measure) a
power to safeguard the nation from the risk of disruption and
power-grabbing by the states ;2" it logically follows that the exercise
of that power must operate not just on private citizens, but on the
states themselves.246
There is a final argument against applyingPrintz in this context.
In New York v. United States, the Court explained that the anti-
commandeering principle exists in part to foster policymaker
accountability by disentangling the lines of government authority.247
If a state implements a policy, it should in fact be a state policy, so
that state officials will be fairly rewarded or punished for that
policy at the polls.24 Thus, federal officials should be unable to force
state officials to adopt federal policies, lest voters hold state officials
responsible for policies not of their own making.249
When it comes to national election rules, however, the problem
of blurred accountability cannot be avoided. This is so because a
"unique legal architecture ... envisions a complex interlacing of
federal and state interests in matters of voting, elections, and
(noting that, after Siebold, state officials "of course" may "be conscripted to execute federal
law" under the Times, Places, and Manner Clause); see also id. at 79 (noting that "elections
are one of the few activities government must carry out"; observing that "their
administration [could not] be privatized").
245. E.g., Green, supra note 201, at 51-52, 55 (noting concerns of the Framers in the area
of elections for federal office "that the State Legislatures will sometimes fail or refuse to
consult the common interest at the expense of their local convenience and prejudices"); see
also Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 120 n.2 (1971) (quoting comments in the framing
period, including a Massachusetts delegate who stated: "[I]f the state legislatures are
suffered to regulate conclusively the elections of the democratic branch, they may... finally
anniilate that control of the general government, which the people ought always to have"),
superseded by U.S. CONST. amend XXVI; United States v. Original Knights of the KK, 250
F. Supp. 350, 355 (1965) (suggesting that federal power to protect integrity of federal
elections authorizes regulation of "public officials or private persons").
246. See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 432 (1819) (noting that "the
American people ... did not design to make their government dependent on the states").
247. 505 U.S. 144, 168-69 (1992).
248. Id. (asserting preference that Congress encourage rather than mandate state
legislation so state officials remain fairly accountable for implementing federally initiated
policy choices).
249. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 577 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring)
(expressing similar concerns about misplaced elector sanctions when the national
government regulates "areas of traditional state concern"), superseded by 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)
(2000).
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political participation." 21 In such a setting, citizens are not likely
to assume, for example, that a national ballot emanates solely
from the state. A national ballot, after all, is a national ballot. It
follows that citizens neither logically should, nor blithely would,
hold state policymakers accountable for all rules and procedures
that govern federal elections. For this reason too, the principle of
Printz should not apply in the distinctive context of federal vote-
process regulation.
3. The Negative-Implication Argument from the "Times, Places
and Manner" Clause
There is a separate, text-driven argument against congressional
invocation of an implied power to pass national-ballot and
voting-equipment laws. Article I, Section 4 and the Seventeenth
Amendment expressly grant Congress the power to regulate the
"Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and
Representatives.""1 At the same time, Article II gives Congress
power to regulate only "the Time" of the selecting and the gathering
of electoral college members.252 The argument that arises is one
from negative implication. If Congress may govern the "Times,
Places and Manner" of congressional elections, but only the "Time"
of presidential elections, then Congress should not be able to control
the "Manner" of presidential elections, including the manner in
which citizens cast their votes."
The first difficulty with this argument is that it was "squarely
rejected" in Burroughs.254 Nor can Burroughs be pushed aside as an
old and misbegotten aberration in the law of presidential elections.
250. ISSACHAROFF ET AL., supra note 175, at 6.
251. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1; U.S. CONST. amend. XVII.
252. U.S. CONST. art II, § 1, cl. 4.
253. See Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112,211 (1971) (Harlan, J., dissenting) ("Even the
power to control the 'Manner' of holding elections, given with respect to congressional
elections by Art. I, § 4, is absent with respect to the selection of presidential electors."),
superseded by U.S. CONST. amend. XXVI; James A. Gardner, Liberty, Community and the
Constitutional Structure ofPolitical Influence:A Reconsideration of the Right to Vote, 145 U.
PA. L. REV. 893,984 (1997) (noting that "[tihis is about as plausible as a text-based argument
can get").
254. Gardner, supra note 253, at 984; see also Burroughs v. United States, 290 U.S. 534,
544-45 (1934).
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For example, in Buckley v. Valeo255 the Court noted that there is
"broad congressional power to legislate in connection with the
elections of the President and Vice President." 6 But it makes no
sense to say that Congress has "broad ... power" over presidential
elections if it cannot in any way regulate the "Manner" of such
elections. This point takes on added, even irresistible, force when
one recognizes that Congress's power to regulate the "Manner" of
House and Senate elections entails a "general supervisory power
over the whole subject" of such elections.257 It is simply a non
sequitur to say that Congress has meaningful authority over
255. 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam).
256. Id. at 14 n.16. Such pronouncements strongly undermine reliance on the Court's
decision in McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U.S. 1 (1892), to claim a lack of congressional power
in this area. In that case, the Court observed that:
Congress is empowered to determine the time of choosing the electors and the
day on which they are to give their votes ... but otherwise the power and
jurisdiction of the State is exclusive, with the exception of the provisions as to
the number of electors and the ineligibility of certain persons, so framed that
Congressional and Federal influence might be excluded.
Id. at 35; see also id. (asserting that "the appointment and mode of appointment of electors
belong exclusively to the States"); id. at 27 (indicating that Article II "convey[s] the broadest
power of determination" and "leaves it to the [state] legislature exclusively to define the
method" of appointment of presidential electors).
These statements must be read in context. The sole issue in McPherson was whether a
state could adopt a district-based system of choosing presidential electors. Id. The Court's
decision that it could is entirely consistent with the argument made here, for there can be
no doubt that Article II committed this sort of basic decision as to the elector-selection
process to the state legislature's discretion. See infra notes 271-74 and accompanying text.
More to the point, the import of McPherson is clarified by the Court's later decisions in
Burroughs andBuckley, which unmistakably held that Congress does have power to regulate
aspects ofpresidential elections that extend wellbeyond the time-related questions expressly
mentioned in Article II, Section 1. Recognizing this congressional authority is not, of course,
inconsistent with the idea "that the State legislature's power to select the manner for
appointing electors is plenary." Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 104 (2000); see also Williams v.
Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 29 (1968) (alluding to states' "extensive power" under the Article II
Manner Clause). That power is, in fact, plenary in the critical sense that state legislatures
alone possess it. But that fact does not mean that Congress cannot invoke its own other
powers (including, but not limited to, the Burroughs power), which, if exercised within their
proper limits, generate federal laws that override contrary state laws pursuant to the Article
VI Supremacy Clause. Cf. Ray v. Blair, 343 U.S. 214,227 (1952) (noting that states' manner-
of-appointment power is "subject to possible constitutional limitations").
257. Smiley v. Holm, 285 U.S. 355, 366, 367 (1932) (noting that "times, places and
manner" language is "comprehensive" and provides "authority to provide a complete code for
congressional elections" and authorizes, among other things, 'prevention offraud and corrupt
practices" and regulation of the "counting of votes"). See generally Green, supra note 201, at
63 (asserting that this "power of Congress to regulate federal elections is vast").
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presidential elections if it cannot (because of the negative
implications of Article I, Section 4) enact a single law that would
fall within the "general supervisory power" over such elections.
An illustration helps make the point. All agree that Congress's
power to regulate the "Manner" of congressional elections permits
it to criminalize ballot-box stuffing in connection with such
elections." Yet if Congress (as the negative-implication argument
indicates) cannot control in any way the "Manner" of presidential
elections, it follows that Congress cannot pass an anti-ballot-
box-stuffing measure applicable to presidential races. Such a
conclusion, however, would stand Burroughs on its head because
that case (even on the very narrowest reading) holds that Congress
may enact just this sort of legislation to counter "corruption" and
"fraud" in the presidential election process. 9 In short, the "Times,
Places and Manner Clause" negative-implication argument proves
too much. Embracing that argument would not fairly narrow the
Burroughs power; it would blow Burroughs away.
The negative-implication argument also fails to take account of
important considerations of constitutional history. Why? Because
the Framers who forged the text of Article II had good reason not
to give Congress a power to control the "Manner" of choosing
presidential electors in light of their expectation that many states
would assign the task of elector-choosing to the state legislature,
rather than to the general electorate.26 Even the most nationalist-
258. See United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 330 (1941) (Douglas, J., dissenting)
(stating that Congress has the power "to protect Congressional elections from any and all
forms of pollution); Exparte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371 (1879) (upholding federal conviction for
such behavior).
259. See generally supra notes 207-10 and accompanying text.
260. See supra notes 17-28 and accompanying text. As explained by Professor Ackerman:
[Under the Framers' plan, legislatures were even free to name their state's
electors without referring the matter to the larger voting public, and many
legislatures availed themselves of this privilege during the early decades. The
prevailing ideology regarded political parties as dangerous, and it seemed risky
to allow them to engage in demagogic campaigns in support of their
Presidential favourites. Why not trust the legislature to select men of probity
who might wisely cast the state's electoral votes without populist pandering?
Ackerman, supra note 216, at 3; see also Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 376 n.8 (1963) ("The
electoral college was designed by men who did not want the election of the President to be
left to the people."); DOUGHERTY, supra note 22, at 1 ("The tendency in this democratic age
is to overlook the fact that the fathers of the Constitution were not believers in the rule of
the people and that it was not until after 1800 that manhood suffrage was adopted in any of
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minded Framers would have balked at letting the newly formed
government of the United States control in detail the "Manner" in
which state legislatures conducted their own internal business.261
Put another way, the negative implication argument rests on a
faulty effort to compare constitutional apples and oranges. An
Article I clause that concerns "[tihe Times, Places and Manner of
holding Elections""2 simply creates no fair implications about an
Article II clause that deals not with electing, but with
"appoint[ing," presidential electors.26 At least this is the case when
those who crafted these clauses well understood that "appointing"
often would be done without "holding elections" at all.
4. The Article H "Manner" Argument
Even if unsuccessful in making a negative-implication argument
basedonArticle I, opponents of congressional-ballot and equipment-
law reforms might advance a separate text-based line of analysis.
On this view, such legislation would clash with each state's express
authority under Article II, Section 1 to choose electors "in such
Manner" as its legislature dictates. 4 According to this argument,
Burroughs is beside the point in assessing ballot-and-equipment
laws because the campaign finance measures at issue in that case
did not involve the actual "Manner" of "appoint[ing]" electors. In
contrast, the argument continues, ballot-and-equipment laws do
concern the "Manner" of appointment because they concern critical
features of the vote-rendering and vote-collecting process itself.
Advocates of the Article II "Manner" argument can also point to In
re Green.65 The Court in that case, while specifically discussing the
the States."). See generally Rosenthal, supra note 30, at 4 ("[T]he manner of presidential
selection evolved very quickly into a form which would have been unrecognizable to the
Framers. With... the advance of democracy, each state eventually directed that its electors
be chosen by universal suffrage.").
261. See FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 769 (1982); id. at 792-95 (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting).
262. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 4, cl. 1 (emphasis added).
263. See, e.g., Paul Carman, Comment, Cousins and La Follette: An Anomaly Created by
a Choice Between Freedom of Association and the Right to Vote, 80 NW. U. L. REV. 666, 674
(1985) (noting that "article II, section 1, clause 2 provides for the appointment of the electors
rather than their election").
264. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 2.
265. 134 U.S. 377 (1890).
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states' Article II manner-of-appointment power, observed that
"where ... the mode of appointment prescribed by the law of the
State is election by the people," Congress "has never undertaken..
to regulate the conduct of such election, or to punish any fraud in
voting for electors; but has left these matters to the control of the
States."266
This passage, however, describes only what Congress had done
(or, more accurately, what it had not done), not what it could do if
it chose to act.26 7 The Article IH "Manner" argument, like the
negative-implication argument from Article I,268 also suffers greatly
from the vice of proving too much. Under Burroughs, for example,
Congress clearly can punish fraud in voting for electors
accomplished through state officials' intentional use of deceptive, or
even flatly inaccurate, ballots. 9 Yet if states, and states alone,
have power to control every aspect of the "Manner" of voting, even
this starkly permissible exercise of the Burroughs power would
become unconstitutional.7
Most important of all, permitting Congress to invoke Burroughs
to mandate use of a national ballot and specified voting technologies
would not encroach on the protected core of state prerogatives in
the field of presidential elector selection. Even if such a law were
held constitutional, it would remain exclusively within the control
of each state to assign the elector-selection function to its
legislature, its executive, or any subgroup of its electorate it wishes
to empower. 1 It also would remain open to those states that choose
266. Id. at 380.
267. See, e.g., Exparte Yarbrough, 110 U.S. 651, 659-61 (1884) (noting that Congress's
delay in legislating to protect federal officials in the exercise of their duties did not bespeak
a lack of the power, it showed only that "no occasion had arisen which required such
legislation").
268. See supra notes 258.59 and accompanying text.
269. Burroughs v. United States, 290 U.S. 534,546-47 (1934) (citing Yarbrough, 110 U.S.
at 666-67).
270. See Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 124 n.7 (1971) (noting that the Court "in
Burroughs... specifically reject[ed] a construction of Art. II, § 1, that would have curtailed
the power of Congress to regulate [presidential] elections"), superceded by U.S. CONST. amend
XXVI. See generally Biden, supra note 221, at 45 (asserting that the proposition "that the
states possessed exclusive authority over the 'manner' of presidential elections was put to
rest in Burroughs").
271. Yarbrough, 110 U.S. at651 (notingthatimpliedfederal authorityto safeguardfederal
elections "is not diminished by the circumstance that the qualification of the voter is
determined by the law of the State where he votes"); Green, supra note 201, at 56 (noting
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 43:851
an elective system to allocate electoral votes, without any federal
interference, by way of a proportionate-representation, quasi-
proportionate-representation, or a winner-take-all systemY2 Ballot-
and-equipment laws simply do not control systems for selecting
electors, substantive selection criteria, or candidates who might
qualify as proper electors."' Rather such laws concern only the
implementing procedures to be used if one available substantive
manner of selection-that is, the election manner-is chosen by the
stateY4 For these reasons, on the better view, ballot-and-equipment
laws do not unduly undermine state control of the "manner" in
which states "appoint" electors in the relevant constitutional
sense.
275
retained state power to fix qualifications for eligible voters in presidential elections).
272. See Hoffman, supra note 212, at 973 (stating that "[piroper respect for principles of
federalism would dictate that, while Congress might place restrictions on the electoral
system, neither Congress nor the federal courts could dictate that all states employ a
particular system"); Michael J. O'Sullivan, Artificial Unit Voting and the Electoral College,
65 S. CAL. L. REV. 2421, 2437 n.114 (1992) (emphasizing that Burroughs reserves choices
about the method of selecting presidential electors to the states).
273. Ray v. Blair, 343 U.S. 214,227 (1952) (suggesting that conditioning elector eligibility
on a pledge to support particular candidates, if elected, may be a proper "exercise of the
state's right to appoint electors in such manner... as it may choose"); id. at 231 (Jackson,
J., dissenting) (indicating that "personal qualifications" for electors are to be prescribed by
the state).
274. Of course, in this area, as in others, the difference between "substance" and
"procedure" is not always stark. See, e.g., Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1941)
(considering the difference between "substance" and "procedure" for purposes of the Rules
Enabling Act). The difference between selecting an electoral system and fixing the mere form
of the ballot used in that system, however, seems stark enough to us.
275. See United States v. Original Knights of the KKK, 250 F. Supp. 330, 354 (E.D. La.
1965) ("Burroughs holds that Congress has the implied power to protect the integrity of the
processes of popular election of presidential electors once that mode of selection has been
chosen by the state") (internal quotation omitted). Lest we be accused of rendering federal
authority in this area free of any practical restraints, we note that we would stop well short
of recognizing the scope of federal congressional power endorsed by even the great
constitutional textualist, Justice Black. In particular, Justice Black found in Burroughs an
endorsement of congressional power to control the qualifications of voters in presidential
elections. Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112,122-24 (1970) (recognizing authority of Congress
to establish nationwide entitlement of eighteen-year-olds to vote in such elections),
superseded by U.S. CONST. amend. XXVI. We disagree. In our view, the Framers gave the
states free rein (subject to restrictions later laid downinthe Fourteenth, Fifteenth, and other
amendments) to put in place whatever body of selectors of presidential electors the state
might choose. Put another way, just as surely as a state could delegate this selection task to
state legislators, state judges, or state executive officials, see supra note 31 and
accompanying text, the state could delegate the task to some other body of state citizens,
defined in whatever way the state legislature might choose, free of federal legislative (albeit
904
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This reading of the Article II Manner Clause jibes with themes
of structure and history sounded in modern Supreme Court
precedents. To begin with, in Anderson v. Celebrezze,"6 the Court
emphasized that state restrictions on presidential elections
"implicate a uniquely important national interest" because "the
President and Vice President of the United States are the only
elected officials who represent all the voters in the Nation."277 The
Court added that "the State has a less important interest in
regulating Presidential elections than statewide or local elections,
because the outcome of the former will be largely determined by
voters beyond the State's boundaries." 278 The suggestion that state
not equal protection and other constitutional) constraints.
276. 460 U.S. 780 (1983).
277. Id. at 795; accord Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 48,112 (2000) (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring)
(quoting and relying on this language to help justify federal court intervention in the
presidential-election case even though "[iln most cases, comity and respect for federalism
compel us to defer to the decisions of state courts on issues of state law"); see also Mitchell,
400 U.S. at 148 (Douglas, J., concurring) ("In presidential elections no parochial interests of
the State, county, or city are involved.").
278. Anderson, 460 U.S. at 795. To be sure, there is dicta in Blitz v. United States, 153
U.S. 308 (1894), that might be read to say that Congress has no greater power to regulate
presidential elections than elections for ordinary state offices. See id. at 313 (distinguishing
between votes at election"for a Representative in Congress," on the one hand, and"for state
officers, including Presidential electors" on the other, adding that, under the operative
statutes, if a voter committed fraud in voting for a state officer, "it was an offence [sic]
against the State, punishable alone by the State"); id. at 314-15 (noting that"[voting, in the
name of another, for a state officer" is a matter with which"the national government has no
concern' so that indictment under relevant federal statutes "should clearly show that the
accused actually voted for a Representative in Congress"). In Burroughs and its progeny,
however, the Court plainly repudiated any such view of governing constitutional doctrine.
If more is needed, it is provided by an appropriately holistic reading of the Constitution's
text, particularly in its present-day form. For example, Section 1 of the Twenty-Fourth
Amendment outlawed poll taxes, but only "in any primary or other election for President or
Vice President, for electors for President or Vice President, or for Senator or Representative
in Congress." U.S. CONST. amend. XXIV, § 1. The obvious implication is that there is a
significant constitutional divide between what are functionally state elections and what are
functionally federal elections, that is, congressionalandpresidential elections. See U.S. Term
Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 805 & n.17 (1995) (noting that "the Constitution
treats both the President and Members of Congress as federal officers"; characterizing
elections of electoral college members as "federal elections'; and indicating that states
"reserve" power over state-officer, but not presidential-elector, elections under the Tenth
Amendment); id. at 844 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (noting salience offederal interests when
dealing with electoral "rights that do not derive from the state power in the first instance but
that belong to the voter in his or her capacity as a citizen of the United States"); supra note
193 (indicating that the Fourteenth Amendment's protection of "privileges or immunities of
citizens of the United States" extends to presidential-elector, but not state-officer, elections);
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claims of control over presidential elections are logically weaker
than claims of control over other elections bolsters the argument for
equating the scope of federal power over presidential and
congressional elections." 9 Even if courts do not push the implied
self-protection power this far, however, the reasoning of Anderson
at least suppotts a more modest conclusion: Courts should not give
the ambiguous Article II, Section 1 "Manner" Clause such an
ambitious interpretation that the Burroughs power all but
disappears.
This conclusion finds even greater support in historical con-
siderations highlighted by the Court in U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v.
Thornton.'O There, in striking down state-imposed term limits for
federal legislators, the Court noted that the Framers had sought in
a variety of ways "to minimize the possibility of state interference
with federal elections. 281 More importantly, this tendency reflected
a deep theoretical stance: the Framers saw American citizens as
forging a "direct link"28 2 with the new federal government they had
formed in their distinctive capacity as "citizens of the United
States."' As Justice Kennedy explained in his concurring opinion:
The Framers split the atom of sovereignty. It was the genius of
their idea that our citizens would have two political capacities,
one state and one federal, each protected from incursion by the
other. The resulting Constitution created a legal system
unprecedented in form and design, establishing two orders of
government, each with its own direct relationship, its own
privity, its own set of mutual rights and obligations to the people
who sustain it and are governed by it.'
cf. U.S. CONST. amend. XXIII (granting power to District of Columbia to appoint presidential
electors). Put another way, if there is anything to the notion that courts must interpret our
Constitution in a manner that takes fair account of all of its provisions, see generally Akhil
Reed Amar, Intratextualism, 112 HAR. L. REv. 747 (1999), there is every reason not to track
the analysis suggested by Blitz that woodenly equates elections of presidential electors with
elections of state governors, legislators, and local officials, while wholly disconnecting them
from elections of federal representatives and senators. Blitz, 153 U.S. at 314-15.
279. See supra notes 211-12 and accompanying text.
280. 514 U.S. 779 (1995).
281. Id. at 808.
282. Id. at 803.
283. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
284. U.S. Term Limits, 514 U.S. at 838 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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It is true that, as part of this "unprecedented" system, states
received power to determine the "Manner" of selecting presidential
electors. But it also is true that the function of those electors was
to select a national president. In the end, courts might give the
"Manner" Clause a sweeping reading that precludes almost all
federal lawmaking with regard to presidential elections, including
in the form of "procedural" rules that concern matters like the
selection of ballots and equipment.28 5 Alternatively, courts might
give the clause a more moderate but still expansive scope by
targeting its preclusive effect on "substantive" matters like who
is eligible to vote for electors." 6 The "direct link" logic of the
U.S. Term Limits case strongly favors this latter reading and the
consequent conclusion that congressional enactment of ballot-and-
equipment laws is permissible.1
7
285. Cf The Supreme Court, 1970 Term, 85 HARV. L. REV. 3, 156 n.19 (1971) (indicating
that Burroughs authorizes federal regulation of "ancillary aspects of the national election
process").
286. See supra notes 271-73 and accompanying text.
287. See Green, supra note 201, at 75 (arguing that the Motor Voter Act is consistent with
U.S. Term Limits in that it improves the link between national citizens and the national
government). It bears emphasis that the themes struck in these recent decisions are not
merely self-serving modem rationalizations, divorced from constitutional history, for
stripping away state powers. Indeed, they fit squarely both with observations made more
than a century ago in Ex parte Yarbrough, see supra notes 196-99 and accompanying text,
and with the even earlier remarks of Justice Joseph Story. As he explained in 1833:
What would be said of a clause introduced into the national constitution to
regulate the state elections of the members of the state legislatures? It would
be deemed a most unwarrantable transfer of power, indicating a premeditated
design to destroy the state governments. It would be deemed so flagrant a
violation of principle, as to require no comment. It would be said, and justly,
that the state governments ought to possess the power of self-existence and self-
organization, independent ofthe pleasure ofthe national government. Why does
not the same reasoning apply to the national government? What reason is there
to suppose, that the state governments will be more true to the Union, than the
national government will be to the state governments?
2 STORY, supra note 28, § 817 (emphasis added) (quoted in Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112,
135 n.17 (1971), superceded by U.S. CONST. amend. XXVI). To be sure, Justice Story's
remarks came in a discussion of recognizing unrestrained state power over federal
congressional elections. Id. § 818. But their logic, as later recognized by the Court in both
Yarbrough and Burroughs, fully carries over to unrestrained state control of elections that
determine the nation's President. See supra notes 196-207 and accompanying text.
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5. Further Problems with the Burroughs Power
In the end, we believe the Burroughs power has a wide enough
reach to embrace national-ballot and voting-equipment legislation.
As we have noted, however, four separate arguments, each of which
is credible in its own right, cut against our conclusion. Some
justices might mount a fifth line of attack, rooted in language from
Burroughs that emphasizes the inherently multistate nature of the
activities controlled by the legislation at issue in that case. 28 8 Still
other justices might claim that the nontextual nature of the
Burroughs power warrants its full and outright repudiation.289
Given the resulting vulnerability of a Burroughs-based defense of
congressional election reforms, it behooves proponents of reform to
look for express grants of power that might support national ballot
and equipment laws. One such grant may rest in the clause that
288. In particular, Burroughs might be read to apply only "to situations which, if not
beyond the power of the state to deal with at all, are beyond its power to deal with
adequately." See supra note 202 and accompanying text (quoting Burroughs). On this
reading, the result in Burroughs was supportable only because the law at issue in that case
involved organizations operating in multiple states. It might follow (according to this
reading) that Congress may not intervene to correct problems with ballots and election
machines because states could"adequately" dealwith those problems internally, even if they
choose not to do so. See Stark, supra note 214, at 375 (suggesting possibility of limiting
federal regulation of presidential elections to situations in which states cannot adequately
handle the regulated problem on their own); The Supreme Court, 1970 Term, supra note 285,
at 156 n.19 (asserting that Burroughs "relied explicitly on the inability of any one state" to
deal with "corruption that ... interstate committees might spawn" and that fixing voting
qualifications "poses no parallel problem"). We would reject this narrow conception of the
Burroughs power because (1) it ignores most of the reasoning of Burroughs itself; (2) it is
inconsistent with later expansive characterizations of the Burroughs power in cases like
Buckley v. Valeo, see supra note 256 and accompanying text; and (3) it misses the key point
that threats to national interests in this area can come as easily from the actions or
omissions of states themselves as from private entities more readily subject to federal, rather
than state, control. See supra notes 244-46 and accompanying text. Indeed, it seems fair to
say that if any problems with regard to presidential elections are "beyond the power of the
state ... to deal with adequately," Burroughs v. United States, 290 U.S. 534, 544-45 (1934),
those problems are ones created by a state's own willful choices to compromise the integrity
of national elections, including through use of antiquated ballots and voting machines.
289. E.g., Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564,612 (1997)
(Thomas, J., dissenting) (advocating repudiation of so-called dormant Commerce Clause in
part because of its nontextual nature); cf. Carman, supra note 263, at 675 (arguing that
Yarbrough "properly read" is a Fifteenth Amendment case so that its invocation in
Burroughs reflected a "misreading"). But see Exparte Yarbrough, 110 U.S. 651, 658 (1884)
(noting that power over federal elections may exist even though an "advocate of the power"
is not "able to place his finger on words which expressly grant it").
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vests power to count electoral votes in federal, rather than state,
authorities.
D. The Congressional Counting Power
The Twelfth Amendment, in conformance with the original
Constitution, specifies that "the President of the Senate shall, in
the presence of the Senate and House of Representatives, open all
the certificates [submitted by presidential electors] and the votes
shall then be counted.""0 The federal authority to count votes
submitted by state-appointed electors clearly does not, of its own
force, permit Congress to compel state use of a national ballot or
specified equipment when ordinary citizens go to the polls. (After
all, it is one thing to count; it is a very different thing to vote.)
But, as leading legislators were quick to observe in the wake
of the Hayes-Tilden election debacle, 1 Congress's power to
count electoral votes does not stand alone. It is supplemented by
Congress's authority under Article I, Section 8 to "make all Laws
which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the
foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution
in the Government of the United States, or in any Department or
Officer thereof."292
The counting power argument for national-ballot and equipment
laws thus proceeds in two steps. First, Congress may pass laws that
are "necessary and proper," that is "convenient"293 or "useful,"294 for
carryinginto execution the counting power. Second, mandated state
use of a national ballot and of high-quality equipment is conducive
to a proper count because it eliminates difficulties in counting that
might otherwise arise.2 95 This two-step logic has an appealing
290. U.S. CONST. amend. XII.
291. See supra notes 93-96 and accompanying text.
292. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
293. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316,413 (1819).
294. See id. at 413-15.
295. A concrete example helps make the point. Had the Supreme Court not injected itself
into the election of 2000, Congress would have had to sort out disputes about electoral votes
from Florida. Any such dispute might have focused on the confusing "butterfly ballot" used
in Palm Beach County. Litigation over this ballot could have delayed Florida's final
certification of its electors beyond the "safe harbor" deadline established by 3 U.S.C. § 5
(2000). Even if a timely certification had occurred, use of this ballot might have caused a
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simplicity and comports with the broad construction of the
Necessary and Proper Clause developed in other contexts.296 For
three separate reasons, however, this line of analysis is subject to
attack, though in the end we find that none of these challenges
carries the day.
First, the Necessary and Proper Clause by its own terms vests
authority in Congress to carry into effect only "the foregoing
Powers, and all other Powers" vested by the Constitution in the
federal government. 297 There is not, however, a congressionalpower
to count votes; there is a congressional duty.2 98 Thus (so the
argument goes), the Necessary and Proper Clause does not apply at
all in this distinctive context.
We would reject this first argument on the theory that the
vesting of a duty, particularly one as important as determining the
identity of our President, inescapably carries with it the grant of a
"power" in the sense that that word is used in the Necessary and
Proper Clause." 9 Indeed, we think there is a strong a fortiori
argument to be made here. If Congress can do anything appropriate
to carry into effect powers it may (but need not) exercise, does it not
logically follow that it can do anything appropriate to carry out
those powers it has no choice but to wield? The recognition of the
existence of less urgently needed powers logically dictates the
recognition of more urgently needed powers as well. °0
competing slate of electors to declare itself the properly recognized delegation from the state.
And use of this ballot might have placed the proper outcome of the Florida election in
sufficient doubt to precipitate other challenges to the initial popular vote. For all these
reasons, use of a national ballot (and the consequent eradication of such election-clouding
excrescences as the Palm Beach ballot) might well be deemed "necessary and proper" to
carrying out the proper-identification-of-the-legitimate-President purposes of the
congressional counting function.
296. E.g., United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 320 (1941) (asserting that the Clause has
been "liberally applied").
297. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 18.
298. U.S. CONST. amend. XII (stating that "the votes shall then be counted") (emphasis
added).
299. The thought is not a new one. See supra notes 91, 95 and accompanying text
(discussing commentary made in the wake of the Hayes-Tilden election, referring to the
Counting Clause "power").
300. Notably, the Court's seminal decision in McCulloch v. Maryland helped undermine
any suggestion that the duty imposed on Congress to count votes negates or diminishes the
operation of the Necessary and Proper Clause in this context. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17
U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316,409-10 (1819) ("The government which has a right to do an act, and has
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A second argument against recognizing a broad counting power
draws on the proposition that the policies that led to the Court's
historically broad application of the Necessary and Proper Clause
do not apply in this context. In giving a far-reaching interpretation
to the so-called "Sweeping Clause," the Court in McCulloch v.
Maryland focused on Congress's powers to shape the primary
activities of government: the powers to wage war, to tax, to borrow,
to spend, to regulate commerce.0 1 Faced with the need to ensure
the "beneficial execution" 0 2 of these "great powers,"0 3 the Court
embraced a construction of the Necessary and Proper Clause that
would best permit Congress to respond to the various "crises of
human affairs""a4 destined to arise over "ages to come."0 5 Such
reasoning, according to this second argument, does not carry over
to the narrow, even quasi-ministerial, task of simply counting
electoral votes. 0 6
In our view, this argument fails for a simple reason. If the
Counting Clause creates a power, then the Necessary and Proper
Clause attaches, and so does the long-settled any-means-that-are-
useful interpretation of the Clause first adopted in McCulloch.0 7
This straightforward "necessary means necessary" logic seems
controlling to us. But if more is needed, it can be supplied. This is
so because the practical problems that crop up in applying the
counting power are not different in kind from the problems
that arise in implementing other constitutional powers. The rich
variety of counting-related problems that might arise in a future of
computers, cyberspace, mass enfranchisement, and hanging chads
were, after all, "exigencies which, if foreseen at all, must have been
imposed on it, the duty of performing that act, must, according to the dictates of reason, be
allowed to select the means.").
301. Id. at 407.08.
302. Id. at 415.
303. Id. at 407.
304. Id. at 415 (emphasis omitted).
305. Id.
306. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 133-34 (1976) (per curiam) (characterizing Counting
Clause "as conferring upon [the] two Houses the same sort of power 'judicial in character...
as was conferred upon each House by Art. I, § 5 with respect to elections of its own members"
and noting that this is "not a general legislative power") (quoting Barry v. United States, 279
U.S. 597, 613 (1929)).
307. McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 413.
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seen dimly" by the Framers more than two centuries ago.308 Thus,
the same flexibility-is-needed argument that drove McCulloch's
broad reading of the Necessary and Proper Clause carries over to
the task of implying "convenient means" for implementing the
counting power. 0
9
There is a final argument for rejecting congressional authority to
pass ballot and equipment legislation under the Counting and
Necessary and Proper Clauses. This argument does not question
the proposition that the Necessary and Proper Clause applies fully
in this context. It posits, however, that ballot and equipment laws
simply are not necessary and proper means for carrying the
counting power into effect. On this view, Congress may invoke the
Necessary and Proper Clause to legislate only those means that
advance an "end" or "purpose" of the enumerated power. 1' For
example, the purpose of the power to create post offices and post
roads is the proper delivery of the mail. It follows that Congress
may outlaw theft of the mail as a means to the end of ensuring mail
delivery.3 1
1
Under this approach, questions of congressional authority
ultimately hinge on how one characterizes the purpose of the
relevant enumerated power, in this case the power granted by the
Counting Clause. For example, one might characterize the purpose
of this power at such a high level of generality (as being, for
example, the production of sound electoral outcomes) that Congress
readily could enact any arguably progressive election-related
reform.1 ' If, however, one characterizes the Clause's purpose very
narrowly (as being, for example, to record accurately those votes
submitted by electoral college members identified, free of any
308. Id. at 415.
309. Id. at 409; see also Green, supra note 201, at 71 (discussing the appropriately broad
role of the Necessary and Proper Clause when invoked in conjunction with Article I, Section
4).
310. J. Randy Beck, Implied Limitations on Implied Powers: The New Jurisprudence of
the Necessary and Proper Clause (2001) (unpublished manuscript, on file with The
University of Illinois Law Review).
311. Id.
312. See infra note 327 (suggesting that the purpose of the counting power is to "protect
the integrity and efficiency of the Presidential election process") (quoting Gressman, supra
note 212, at 356-57); cf. United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 320 (1941) (suggesting that
the purpose of the Article I Counting Clause is to safeguard the "right of choice by the people
of representatives in Congress").
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federal intervention, in a selection process established exclusively
by state legislatures), then the Necessary and Proper Clause might
not permit national-ballot and national-voting-equipment
legislation.
There is one key difficulty with the narrow-characterization line
of argument in this context. The problem is that, however narrowly
one attempts to describe the purpose of Congress's counting power,
it must include at least the authority to resolve disputes between
contesting slates of electors.318 Yet once one recognizes this umpire-
of-the-fight purpose of the counting power, it logically follows that
Congress may pass laws designed to help it resolve competing slate
contests if and when they arise. Moreover, precisely because a
logical source of electoral slate contests will be disputes over which
slate received the most popular votes, federal measures that help
clarify that determination, as ballot and equipment laws surely
could, should be held constitutional. In short, if the Necessary and
Proper Clause applies to the counting power (as we believe it
does),314 then ballot and equipment laws should hold up under even
a very narrow conception of the ends encompassed within that
power.
One might respond that a purpose of resolving elector-slate
contests should vest Congress with no more power than to resolve
such contests if and when they occur.315 But as Professor Rosenthal
urged: "Legislation injected into so delicate an area as the choice of
the President would be much more salutary if enacted to provide for
future eventualities rather than directed to an existing election
313. See Rosenthal, supra note 30, at 32 (suggesting that counting power at least implies
authority for "determining which of two contending slates of electors was validly chosen");
cf. Ackerman, supra note 216, at 5 (noting that Florida "could well have sent sets of votes
from two different groups of electors to Washington" if "the United States Supreme Court
had stayed on the sidelines").
314. See supra notes 297-309 and accompanying text.
315. The argument might go something like this: The purpose of the counting power is
solely to determine which candidate received what number of votes. To achieve this purpose
Congress can and must decide between competing slates of electors. But that is all Congress
can do. In other words, deciding between competing slates is not a purpose of the counting
power; it is only a means to the end of determining final vote totals pursuant to state-
prescribed processes and rules. Dictating the use of federally specifiedballots and equipment
is not, on this view, a means designed to achieve this objective; indeed, such a means would
frustrate this end by displacing state vote-generating procedures with federally specified
ones.
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
controversy."' 16 Drawing on the lessons of 1876 and 2000, we would
be even more blunt: It is far preferable to lay out election rules in
advance, rather than making on-the-fly (and predictably partisan)
post hoc judgments. 17
We recognize that others might disfavor a broad application of
the Necessary and Proper Clause in this setting. 18 They might
say that carrying out the counting power was meant, from all
appearances, to be merely a mechanical exercise.31 They might
add that the subtle architecture of the Constitution supports
this state-authority-maximizing position because it surrounds the
Counting Clause with grants of authority to persons outside the
federal government. (Thus, Article II vests primary power in state
legislatures; 2 state legislatures in turn designate a body of
selectors;321 it falls solely to this body of selectors to choose the
state's members of the electoral college; 22 and these electors, who
themselves "are not federal officers or agents,"3  then tender ballots
for congressional counting after convening in their own states.")
Let us assume, based on these considerations, that Congress may
not pass any law of any kind merely because it is "conducive" to
effective counting. 2' Forced to draw some other line, we would
nonetheless conclude that Congress, at a minimum, may go as far
in enacting prospective legislation pursuant to its counting power
as it might go with its Burroughs power as outlined in the
preceding section of this Article. 26
Indeed, one way of conceiving the "implied" Burroughs power is
to say that it is in fact an express power that flows from the
316. Rosenthal, supra note 30, at 36.
317. See William Josephson & Beverly S. Ross,Repairing the Electoral College, 22J.LEGIS
145, 148 n.21 (1996) (arguing that the House of Representatives should adopt rules related
to presidential selection without "waiting for a specific, politically charged context").
318. See supra note 78 and accompanying text (noting congressional misgivings about the
constitutionality of the Electoral Count Act of 1887).
319. See supra note 306 and accompanying text.
320. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 2.
321. See supra note 271 and accompanying text.
322. In re Green, 134 U.S. 377, 379 (1890).
323. Ray v. Blair, 343 U.S. 214, 224 (1952).
324. U.S. CONST. amend. XII.
325. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316,418 (1819).
326. See supra notes 196-233 and accompanying text.
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Counting and the Necessary and Proper Clauses. 2 ' We have doubts
about whether the power inferable from the Counting Clause
reaches only as far as the power that flows from the federal
government's "power of self protection."328 But, in the end, we are
comfortable saying that the counting power goes at least this far.
We add only that the history spawned by the election of 1876
confirms our conclusion that the Counting and Necessary and
Proper Clauses, operating in tandem, permit Congress to do more
than resolve disputes between competing elector slates after they
arise.329 In passing the Act of 1887, after all, Congress adopted a
law specifically designed to establish rules for prospectively
deciding competing-slate election contests."' It also asserted a
power to reject, in some circumstances, votes "of electors whose
appointments have been lawfully certified by proper state
authority" even in the absence of an elector-slate contest.3 In
327. Rosenthal, supra note 30, at 31-36 (discussing Burroughs in the context of exploring
the reach of the counting power); see also Gressman, supra note 211, at 356-57 (citing
Burroughs in asserting that Congress has "vested powers under article II, section 1 and
under the necessary and proper clause to preserve and protect the integrity and efficiency
of the Presidential electionprocess"). Another possibility is to say thatBurroughs reflects the
joint operation of the Necessary and Proper Clause and the express powers bestowed on the
President to execute the laws, serve as Commander in Chief, and the like. U.S. CONST. art.
II, § 1, cl. 1; § 2. On this view, a fair and accurate counting of the vote is critical to ensuring
the legitimacy of the presidency, which in turn is critical to the effective exercise of the
President's powers. See generally 1 TRIBE, supra note 193, § 5-3, at 805 (noting that
Necessary and Proper Clause applies to noncongressional, as well as congressional, powers
created by the Constitution). Some language in Burroughs suggests the Court's own
receptivity to this approach. Burroughs v. United States, 290 U.S. 534, 545 (1934) ("The
President is vested with the executive power of the nation. The importance of his election
and the vital character of its relationship to and effect upon the welfare and safety of the
whole people cannot be too strongly stated.").
328. Burroughs, 290 U.S. at 545.
329. See Rayv. Blair, 343 U.S. 214, 229-30 (1952) (stating that a"long-continued practical
interpretation ... weighs heavily in considering the constitutionality" of a government
practice).
330. 3 U.S.C. § 15 (2000).
331. Rosenthal, supra note 30, at 28 n.114; see also 3 U.S.C. §§ 5, 15 (2000); DOUGHERTY,
supra note 22, at 235 ("No definition of regularly given' is provided, and while Congress has
thus far always recorded the electoral votes as actually cast, it might at some time treat this
[statute] as authorizing it to reject votes cast contrary to pledge or expectation."); Rosenthal,
supra note 30, at 27-38 (arguing that, although the Twelfth Amendment "is not definitely a
final commitment to Congress of the power to resolve disputed votes, ... it has some of the
hallmarks of one"; adding that "Congress itself established the procedures whereby the
Hayes-Tilden imbroglio was decided and has since enacted permanent legislation purporting
to regulate future disputes").
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short, for 125 years, Congress has deemed itself empowered to
protect "the integrity of the electoral process,"332 including by fixing
useful rules that operate prospectively to deal with potential
electoral-vote contests. We share the view of Congress that such a
power exists. We also believe that such a power should support
national-ballot and voting-equipment legislation precisely because
the essential purpose of such legislation is to clarify electoral-vote
results in a way that ensures that the real winner really wins.
Having set forth our view of the counting power, we acknowledge
that the Court (and especially the federalism-minded current Court)
may well reject it. We also recognize that, even if the Burroughs
principle maps the boundary of the counting power, the Court
could read Burroughs narrowly and deem national-ballot or
voting-equipment legislation as falling outside its authorizing
reach. Might Congress nonetheless successfully deploy the
Necessary and Proper Clause to accomplish national-ballot and
mandated-voting equipment reforms? We think so and now turn to
demonstrating why.
E. Regulatory Authority Under the Article I "Times, Places and
Manner" Clause
Under Article I, Section 4, "[tlhe Times, Places and Manner of
holding Elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be
prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof; but the
Congress may at any time by law make or alter such Regulations." 3
3
Under this grant of power there can be no doubt that Congress
could establish a uniform national ballot for congressional and
senatorial elections. Nothing could be more central to the "Manner
of holding elections," after all, than stipulating the way in which
citizens actually cast their votes.3 4
If Congress may establish a uniform national ballot for
representatives and senators, may it also spell out how, on that
same ballot, the vote for presidential candidates should take place?
The Necessary and Proper Clause suggests that it may do so as a
332. Biden, supra note 221, at 47.
333. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4 (emphasis added).
334. See supra notes 253, 264-65 and accompanying text.
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means to accomplish the purposes of its power to regulate
congressional elections.335 It is a common and logical practice to list
presidential candidates at the top of ballots presented to the voter.
Particularly in these circumstances, the argument goes, if the
manner of presenting candidates for President were to differ from
the federally specified manner of presenting candidates for the
Senate and the House, a risk of voter confusion would arise. For
this reason, it seems "conducive to" establishing a workable uniform
ballot for national senators and representatives that the ballot for
President be presented to voters as part of an integrated menu of
voting choices for federal offices.336 Such a ballot would carry with
it advantages directly related to ensuring the fair, sound, and well-
informed selection of senators and representatives. A uniform
ballot, for example, would identify and differentiate among, and
thus direct attention to, all federal offices at stake in any election.
A uniform ballot could specify in a clear and consistent manner all
candidates' party affiliations, so as to inform the voter of each
Senate and House candidate's party alignment or nonalignment
with contemporaneously running presidential candidates. A
uniform ballot would avoid the risk that a separate state-produced
presidential election ballot would signify the lesser importance of
Senate and House races and divert attention away from them.
Indeed, inclusion of the presidential ballot on the Senate and House
ballot might well induce a higher level of voter participation in
Senate and House races, a salutary goal that Congress should be
able to pursue under its Article I, Section 4 power. 37 In all these
ways, an integrated national ballot would be helpful to "carrying
into execution" the congressional power to control the manner of
electing senators and representatives.
It is noteworthy that potential barriers to using other powers to
enact national ballot and equipment legislation are inapplicable to
Article I, Section 4. Why? Because:
335. See generally supra notes 291-96, 304-11 and accompanying text (discussing
Necessary and Proper Clause).
336. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 418 (1819).
337. James M. Fischer, Network "Early Calls" of Elections: An Analysis of the Legality of
Proposals to Keep the VotingProcess from Becoming anAcademic Exercise, 14 SW.U. L. REV.
427, 442 (1984) (noting that "combining potentially interesting races for federal and state
offices ... increases voter interest and participation").
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(1) In contrast to exercises of the Fourteenth Amendment,
Section 5 power, laws passed under Article I and the Necessary
and Proper Clause need not be remedial, and may be far less
"proportionate" to rectifying some judicially determinable consti-
tutional wrong. 38 It is, instead, enough that the law be "conducive"
to carrying into effect Congress's election-regulation power. 39
Because presidential elections and congressional elections are in
actual experience so functionally intertwined, regulating the
manner of the former seems plainly related to successfully
regulating the manner of the latter.
(2) The most problematic aspects of relying on the "implied"
Burroughs power are also inapplicable in this setting. Any
misgivings about implied powers in general34 ° do not apply to the
"Times, Places and Manner" Clause precisely because it is a clause.
The anticommandeering principle of Printz.4 ' clearly does not
operate in this context.3 42 And any rule that might limit the
Burroughs power to countering only active corruption (which rule
springs from the implied sovereign right of "self-protection")3 4 3 falls
out of the picture when the express Times, Places, and Manner
Clause provides the basis for congressional intervention.3 "
338. See supra notes 168-72 and accompanying text (describing Section 5 enforcement
power).
339. McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 418.
340. See supra note 289 and accompanying text.
341. See supra notes 234-50 and accompanying text.
342. See Association of Cmty. Orgs. for Reform Now v. Miller, 129 F.3d 833, 837 (6th Cir.
1997) (stating that "Article I section 4 explicitly grants Congress the authority to force states
to alter their regulations regarding federal regulations, and does not condition its grant of
authority on federal reimbursement"); Voting Rights Coalition v. Wilson, 60 F.3d 1411, 1415
(9th Cir. 1995) (stating that, under Article I, Congress may conscript state agencies to carry
out voter registration for the election of representatives and senators); Jason P.W. Halperin,
A Winner at the Polls: A Proposal for Mandatory Voter Registration, 3 N.Y.U. J. LEG. & PUB.
POL',, 69, 115-16 (1999) (arguing that the limits of Printz are inapplicable to congressional
regulation of voter registration because of the explicit grant of authority to Congress to make
or alter federal election laws); Green, supra note 201 at 67 (endorsing results inAssociation
of Community Organizations for Reform Now and Voting Rights Coalition cases).
343. See supra notes 196-201 and accompanying text.
344. Moreover, even assuming that the Times, Places, and Manner Clause precludes, by
negative implication, a freestanding implied Burroughs' power to regulate the "Manner" of
presidential elections, see supra notes 251-63 and accompanying text, this negative
implication argument would not easily extend to otherwise permissible extrapolations from
the "Times, Places, and Manner" power itself. It is one thing to say that Article II, Section
I's failure to mention the "Manner" of presidential elections precludes discovering such a
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(3) Finally, the main arguments against employing the Necessary
and Proper Clause in conjunction with congressional authority to
count electoral votes3 45 do not apply to the sweeping power of
Congress to control "the Manner" of congressional elections.146 Most
important, this broad power resembles other grants of authority
subject to the full-bore operation of the Necessary and Proper
ClaUse.4 7 It does not, as might be said of the Counting Clause,
place on Congress only a narrow mandate to act in a context
dominated by grants of exclusive power to nonfederal officials.3'
For these reasons, the Necessary and Proper Clause has an all-out
force in this setting that it might lack when attached solely to the
counting "duty."
349
There are, of course, limits on Congress's ability to rely on the
joint operation of the Times, Places and Manner and Necessary and
Proper Clauses. It might well be, for example, that Congress could
not invoke the Sweeping Clause to regulate ballots for state office-
holders in an effort to avoid confusion in voting for House and
Senate offices. 50 But the root of such a limitation would lie in the
power within the deep recesses of the Constitution's architecture and extrapolated
presuppositions. It is quite another thing to say that this drafting omission somehow trumps
a straightforward application of the Necessary and Proper Clause to carry out the express
grant of congressional power in Article I, Section 2.
345. See supra notes 297-326 and accompanying text.
346. See Smileyv. Holm, 285 U.S. 355,366-67 (1932) (noting that Congress has a"general
supervisory power" over congressional elections and can provide a "complete code" for them)
(quotingEx parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371, 387 (1880)); Association ofCmty. Orgs. forReform
Now, 56 F.3d at 796 (noting that "Congress has passed a large number of laws altering state
regulations of federal elections"); United States v. Munford, 16 F. 223 (E.D. Va. 1883) ("There
is little regarding an election that is not included in the terms, time, place, and manner....);
Jonathan E. Davis, Comment, The National Voter Registration Act of 1993: Debunking
States' Rights Resistance and the Pretense of Voter Fraud, 6 TEMP. POL. & Civ. RTS. L. REV.
117, 124 (1997) (citing case law for proposition that Congress has authority over "the entire
electoral process from the first step of registering to the verification of the state's return).
347. See supra notes 300-01 and accompanying text (discussingMcCulloch's treatment of
taxing, commerce, and other powers).
348. See supra notes 302-24 and accompanying text.
349. See supra notes 297-98 and accompanying text.
350. Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 124-25 (1971) (emphasizing states' retention of
broad power over state elections, in contrast to federal elections), superseded by U.S. CONST.
amend. XXVI; Blitz v. United States, 153 U.S. 308, 314 (1894) (same); United States v.
Reese, 92 U.S. 214, 218 (1875) (holding that Congress has no general power over state and
local elections); see also Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. at 393 (distinguishing congressional
regulation of federal and state elections); Voting Rights Coalition v. Wilson, 60 F.3d 1411,
1415 (9th Cir. 1995) (emphasizing that Congress did not seek to regulate elections of state
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overwhelming primacy of state control over state elections, a
consideration that simply does not carry over to voting for pres-
idential electors.3 51 We see no reason, then, why Congress lacks
broad authority to regulate presidential elections (including by
creating a national ballot) to optimize accuracy, information, and
participation in voting for House and Senate races.
We again recognize, however, that we may lose this argument.
Courts might declare that it involves too long a leap to say that
Congress may regulate presidential elections because doing so is
"Necessary and Proper" to governing the election of senators and
representatives. Courts might also extract from the contrasting
texts of Article I and Article II a principle that bars Congress
from regulating the "Manner" of voting for presidential electors,
including through ballot and equipment laws, regardless of the
power that Congress invokes. 52 Even if these constricting inter-
pretations take hold, however, we suspect that the "Times, Places
and Manner" power would give Congress the practical capacity to
secure universal (or at least nearly universal) use of a nationally
prescribed presidential ballot. Consider a future in which Congress
mandated a nationally applicable ballot layout for House and
Senate elections and simultaneously encouraged states to follow
companion "guidelines" for the presidential race. In our view, if
such a law were passed and such an invitation were issued, states
would probably go along. We simply have a hard time seeing why
they would not. 5 '
officials in passing the "Motor Voter" law); Halperin, supra note 342, at 116 (stating that "a
strong argument could be made that Congress does not have the power to regulate state
elections because the Tenth Amendment would reserve this power to the states"); Note,
Statutory Regulation of Political Campaign Funds, 66 HARV. L. REV. 1259, 1261 (1953)
(noting that "[d]irect congressional regulation of non-federal elections raises serious
constitutional problems").
351. See supra notes 277-78 and accompanying text (noting argument that state interest
is distinctively limited with regard to presidential elections).
352. See supra notes 264-66 and accompanying text.
353. See Fischer, supra note 337, at 441 (noting that most states tend to coordinate the
dates for state elections and federal elections); see also Halperin, supra note 342, at 116
(noting that, after Congress legislatively enfranchised eighteen-year-olds infederal elections,
state legislatures became willing to enfranchise them in state elections as well to avoid the
'confusion and expense of running elections with two separate electorates").
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Let us assume, however, that our prediction proves inaccurate.
Do patrons of national ballot and equipment legislation have one
last arrow in their quiver? Indeed, they do.
F. The Conditional Spending Power
We have identified a variety of possible sources of congressional
power for legislating national ballot and election-equipment
measures. Assume, however, that all these sources of power fail.
There always remains the last, great hope of congressional
intervention: the so-called "conditional spending" power."
Suppose that Congress enacts a spending law that makes
federal funds available to states with the goal of increasing
fairness and accuracy in presidential elections. Assume, in addition,
that Congress makes each state's access to these funds conditional
on the state's agreement to use only certain election equipment
and a uniform ballot designed by federal authorities" Present-day
spending-power doctrine strongly suggests that this law would be
constitutional. First, Congress is permitted to implement conduct-
shaping programs by way of the conditional spending technique
that it could not directly impose under its enumerated non-
spending powers.355 Second, any Printz-based limitation on the
national conscription of state authorities would not take hold in this
setting. No "conscription" can occur, after all, when a state freely
chooses to opt into a federal spending program.3 56 Third, any
condition to the effect that the state shall use a national ballot and
voting equipment would be (as it must be) "germane" to the
spending program's goal of heightening accuracy and fairness in
elections;357 indeed, the essential purpose behind these reforms is
354. See id. at 117 (noting that early versions of what became the "Motor Voter" law
included federal spending conditions).
355. South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203,206 (1987) (stating that Congress can regulate
drinking ages through use of its Spending Power even if it cannot do so directly); Buckleyv.
Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 90-91 (1976) (per curiam) (holding that spending power"is not limited by
the direct grants of legislative power found in the Constitution") (quoting United States v.
Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 66 (1936)).
356. See New Yorkv. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 167 (1992) (recognizing that "Congress
may influence a State's legislative choices," free of the anticornmandeering principle, by
conditioning federal expenditures).
357. Id.; accord, Dole, 483 U.S. at 207-08 & n.3.
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to mitigate voter confusion and opportunities for error. Finally, no
"independent constitutional bar" under the First Amendment or
otherwise would block Congress from conditioning these funds on
state use of a national ballot or federally favored equipment. 8
This is the case because such a law would in no way "induce the
States to engage in activities that would themselves be unconsti-
tutional." 59 After all, every state would be free, under governing
constitutional doctrine, to use such ballots or equipment if that
were its wish.
In light of these principles, we believe Congress could attach even
more far-reaching conditions to releasing presidential-election-
improvement funds to states. Consistent with the program's
purpose of ensuring fairness and accuracy, for example, we might
well (were we judges) uphold a conditional insistence that states
abandon winner-take-all systems because of the crudely unrep-
resentative results they produce. It is important to recognize,
however, that the farther conditions go in the direction of impinging
on traditional areas of state authority (for example, by disallowing
winner-take-all systems) the less likely it is that those conditions
will be incorporated into federal spending programs in the first
instance. Because structural features of the Constitution cause
federal authorities to be watchful of state interests, federal decision
makers are likely to act with caution in pushing states away from
controlling electoral prerogatives they historically have exercised. 
Even if Congress did impose aggressive conditions on the release
of federal funds, however, there is no assurance Congress would
achieve its aim of having its policy preferences implemented by the
states. Indeed, the more intrusive Congress's conditions become on
state prerogatives, the more likely it is that they will be rejected
when state authorities are given a choice whether to accept or reject
them. This point is of particular significance in assessing the
prospects of any conditional spending program that requires
abandonment of the winner-take-all approach. Why? Because, even
if only a few states initially decline federal funds, so as to retain
their winner-take-all systems, it is probable that other states would
358. Dole, 483 U.S. at 208.
359. Id. at 210.
360. See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985), superseded by
42 U.S.C. § 2000d-7 (1994).
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soon follow suit. The same "arm's race" for electoral power that led
to all-but-universal embrace of winner-take-all systems in the early
nineteenth century would likely induce a similar migration away
from participating in a spending program that imposed this same
condition.36' The bottom line is that Congress in theory can use its
conditional spending power to undo the winner-take-all system. It
is doubtful, however, whether Congress in fact could succeed in
achieving this reform by way of a conditional-spending approach.
V. A CALL FOR ACTION
Even if our analysis and others like it persuade a majority in
Congress that it has the constitutional power to impose more
uniform procedures on the way states conduct federal elections,
there is no assurance that it will do so. As events following the
Hayes-Tilden election illustrate, there is a powerful political inertia
in the field of election reform.362 Once elected under any given
system, incumbent office holders are naturally reluctant to change
it for a simple reason: it worked for them. Dominant political
parties and interest groups display a similar attachment to the
status quo. Before they take action, they will always carefully
consider how that action might impact their political fortunes. 33
That is one reason why the electoral college persists and funda-
mental campaign-finance reform is unlikely to become law. 64 And
if lawmakers plausibly can maintain that the Constitution bars
them from taking action incompatible with their perceived self-
interest, so much the better for them.365
Notwithstanding the forces of stasis, it remains our hope that a
bipartisan consensus can be forged for uniform voting procedures
in federal elections. A consensus for uniform electoral-vote-counting
rules did emerge in the wake of the Hayes-Tilden election.
361. E.g., Rosenthal, supra note 30, at 4-5 (noting that, when some states adopted winner-
take-aU systems, they secured "an influence far greater than a state whose electoral vote was
divided" so that "by a sort of Gresham's Law, the states in the latter group felt obliged, in
self-defense, to follow suit"; thus the "'general ticket' method became universal"). See
generally supra notes 16-23 and accompanying text.
362. See supra Part II.
363. Fish, supra note 119, at A29.
364. See Cohen & Jacobson, supra note 119, at 3658; Drinan, supra note 129, at B-13.
365. See Fish, supra note 119, at A29.
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Constitutional concerns about states' rights, then so much stronger
than today, ultimately evaporated.366 In today's political environ-
ment, marked by less partisan bitterness and far less regional
strife, why should our lawmakers not be able to gather a similar
will for action?
Incumbent office holders and dominant political parties have a
profound interest in public perceptions about the legitimacy of the
election process. They should have an even keener interest in the
reality of procedural fairness and accuracy in the choice of our
nation's chief executive officer. These considerations, which spurred
the 1887 reforms, are at stake once again. The 2000 presidential
election in Florida pushed them into bold relief. Now, more than
ever, voters are calling for basic reforms to insure that their votes
count.367 Unlike abolishing the electoral college or implementing
fundamental campaign-finance reform, putting in place accurate
voting equipment and uniform ballots need not benefit any one
candidate or party. Indeed, both major parties may well benefit
from sound reforms by diminishing general disillusionment and
the resulting emergence of third-party competitors. A logical way
to proceed is through a bipartisan election-reform commission
as proposed in various bills currently before Congress. 8 If such a
commission can agree on standardized voting procedures that
insure a fairer presidential election without favoring candidates of
either party, Congress should rise above partisan divisions to
implement them. 6
9
Some local officials will vigorously oppose mandatory
standardized voting procedures for federal elections. 370 They may
366. See supra Part II.
367. E.g., Moberg, supra note 121, at 12; Murray, supra note 131, at 3722; Rosenberg,
supra note 120, at 20.
368. See supra Part III.
369. See, for example, the Federal Elections Review Commission Act, H.R. 57,107th Cong.
(2001), introduced by abroad, bipartisan coalition of House members ledby Representatives
Peter DeFazio (D-Oregon) and Jim Leach (R-Iowa), and the Commission on the
Comprehensive Study of Voting Procedures Act of 2001, S. 216, 107th Cong. (2001),
introduced by a bipartisan coalition of senators led by Arlen Specter (R-Pennsylvania) and
Tom Harkin (D-Iowa).
370. See Brigette Greenberg, Election Officials Demand Changes In Voting Process,
CHATTANOOGA TIMES, Feb. 3, 2001, at A4. Giving a constitutional spin to this issue, for
example, New York State elections director Tom Wilkey stated, "We don't have federal
elections, we have state elections forfederal office. That responsibility was given to the states
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have an interest in maintaining the way they do things in their
states or in simply maintaining authority over choices to be made
down the road. Local officials will make the case for voluntary
federal grants for state-initiated election reforms.3"' Even if those
grants go only to fund federally approved reforms, however, they
cannot insure uniformity. Not all states will rise to the bait, and
even those states that take it may differ in what changes they
choose to implement. 72 Needed reforms require a congressional fiat.
As Part IV indicates, we believe Congress has the power to
prescribe procedures for conducting federal elections. We urge it to
do so. Such legislative reforms succeeded in 1887 and can succeed
again.
CONCLUSION
The American people dodged disaster as the year 2000 drew to a
close. As our nation sorted through the uncertainties generated by
an extraordinarily close presidential election, it was not at war.
There were no riots in urban centers, at work sites, or on college
campuses. Unemployment was low. Optimism was high.
Such conditions do not mark every presidential election year. In
times of war or economic crisis, the uncertainty and conten-
tiousness that followed last year's November balloting could trigger
partisan enmity, class- or race-based division, loss of faith in our
system, episodes of violence, or worse. Under the conditions that
when this country was founded." Tanner, supra note 127 (quoting Wilkey).
371. Greenberg, supra note 370, at A4; accord Murray, supra note 131, at 3722.
372. Even Florida officials seem to have backed offfrom committing significant resources
to election reform. Dana Canedy, Less Talk of Florida Voting Reform as Jeb Bush Unveils
Plan, N.Y. TINIEs, Mar. 7, 2001, at 1; see also Election Reform Act of 2001, H.R. 263, 107th
Cong. (2001) (establishing a national Election Administration Commission to study voting
procedures, to develop "voluntary" election standards, and to award matching grants to
encourage states to implement qualifying reforms). Proposing such an approach, Senator
Charles E. Schumer of New York stated:
The point isn't to simply pick one method and go with it .... We should look at
all of them, see what works best, figure out how to fix what doesn't work, and
then provide the states with the know-how and funds they need to implement
new systems.
Murray, supra note 131, at 3722. Given the "election mess in Florida," however, reform
proponent Peter Defazio, a House member from Oregon, counters: "We can do it better in
21st-century America. ... If the federal government has to come on in and step on some
states' toes, then so be it." Id.
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prevailed at the time of the Hayes-Tilden election dispute, there
were genuine worries that the Nation might come apart at the
seams. There can be no assurance that similar conditions will not
recur in the future.
We have laid out in this Article arguments in support of
Congress's extensive power to regulate the processes of presidential
elections. To be sure, there are limits on what Congress can do, and
no set of new laws will eliminate all chance of future controversy in
races for the presidency. There can be no doubt, however, that
federal establishment of a uniform ballot and minimum requisites
for election equipment would take us far down the pathway of
positive reform. The 107th Congress, following the example of the
49th Congress, should adopt these measures. The power to do so
exists; popular support for such action is great; the recent election
reveals its wisdom; and the potential dangers of failing to act are
too grave for our nation's lawmakers to leave them unaddressed.
